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ABSTRACT
We study discrete resource allocation problems in which agents have unit demand
and strict preferences over a set of indivisible objects. Such problems are known as
house allocation problems. We define a new property that we call “balancedness.”
We characterize the top trading cycles from individual endowments by Pareto ef-
ficiency, group strategy-proofness, reallocation-proofness and balancedness. When
there are at least four agents or just two agents, we characterize the top trading cy-
cles from individual endowments by Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness and
balancedness. When there are three agents, an allocation rule is Pareto efficient,
group strategy-proof and balanced if and only if it is a top trading cycles rule from
individual endowments or a trading cycles rule with three brokers.
We also study house allocation problems with weak preferences. We show that the
serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, strategy-
proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency. Furthermore, the serial dictatorship with
fixed tie-breaking is not Pareto dominated by any Pareto efficient and strategy-proof
rule. We also show that the random serial dictatorship with fixed (or random) tie-
breaking is equivalent to the top trading cycles from random endowments with fixed
(or random) tie-breaking.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 House allocation problems
Since the pioneering work of Shapley and Scarf (1974), a large literature has stud-
ied discrete resource allocation problems. Such a problem consists of a set of agents
and a set of indivisible objects. Each agent consumes one object, and has a privately
known preference relation over the set of objects. Each object can only be assigned
to one agent, and objects do not care who they are assigned to. These problems are
known as one-sided matching problems as opposed to two-sided matching problems.
In a two-sided matching problem, there are two disjointed sets of agents, and each
agent in one set has a preference relation over the agents in the other set. Real life
examples of discrete resource allocation problems include assigning students to uni-
versity apartments (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1999), allocating and exchanging
transplant organs, like kidneys (Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver 2004) or lungs (Ergin,
So¨nmez and U¨nver 2015), etc. There are no monetary transfers in these settings.
When Shapley and Scarf (1974) initiated the problem, they used the example of
houses and traders. Since then, such problems are now known as house allocation
problems. In their problem, each agent initially owns one house and can possibly
trade it for a better one in the market. So their model is also known as a housing
market model in the literature. They defined the strict core. An allocation is in
the strict core if there is no subset of agents such that by reallocating their endowed
houses among themselves, at least one of them is strictly better off, and the others
in the subset are not worse off. They proposed the top trading cycles algorithm
invented by David Gale to find an allocation in the strict core. The top trading
cycles algorithm consists of a serial of finite steps. At each step, each remaining
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agent points to the agent who owns her best choice among the remaining houses. A
set of agents forms a cycle whenever their best choices are the houses owned by the
agents in this set. A single agent who owns her favorite house also forms a cycle by
pointing to herself. Remove all cycles from the market, assign each agent in a cycle
her best choice, and proceed to the next step. The algorithm stops when everyone is
assigned. Shapley and Scarf (1974) used an example to show that the strict core may
disappear if indifferences are allowed. In what follows, we assume that preferences
are strict unless otherwise mentioned.
Roth and Postlewaite (1977) showed that the strict core allocation is unique.
Roth (1982a) showed that the strict core mechanism is strategy-proof, i.e., truthfully
reporting one’s preference is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent. Bird (1984)
showed that it is group strategy-proof, i.e., there is no subset of agents who can
jointly misreport their preferences such that at least one agent in the group is strictly
better off while the others are not worse off. Ma (1994) characterized the strict core
mechanism by individual rationality (i.e., each agent weakly prefers her assigned
object to her endowed object), Pareto efficiency (i.e., no other allocation exists such
that all agents are weakly better off and some agent is strictly better off) and strategy-
proofness. However, in the two-sided matching problems even with strict preferences,
efficiency and strategy-proofness are incompatible. For example, in the marriage
problem, it is well-known that there exists no individual rational mechanism that is
both Pareto efficient and strategy-proof (Theorem 3 in Roth 1982b; Proposition 1 in
Alcalde and Barbera` 1994).
Unlike Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) housing market model, all objects could be
initially owned by a social planner and she determines a priority ranking of agents.
Agents choose their best choices sequentially according to a priority ranking. This
allocation rule is a serial dictatorship. Svensson (1999) characterized the serial dic-
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tatorships by strategy-proofness, non-bossiness (i.e., if an agent cannot change their
assignment by misreporting their preference relation, then she cannot change the
assignments of other agents) and neutrality (i.e., the “real” outcome is independent
of the indexes of objects). Ergin (2002) generalized the serial dictatorships by allow-
ing each distinct object type to have multiple copies (for example, each school has
multiple seats for students) and different object types may have different priority
rankings of agents. Ergin studied the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, defined
a property of acyclicity for a priority structure (i.e., for house allocation problems
with unit capacity for each object type, there exist no objects o and o′ and agents i, j
and k such that for object o, i has a higher priority than j and j has a higher priority
than k, and for object o′, k has a higher priority than i), and showed the equivalence
between acyclical priority, Pareto efficient DA mechanism, group strategy-proof DA
mechanism, and consistent (i.e., whenever some agents receives their assignments,
we can remove these agents and their assignments from the market without changing
the assignments of other agents) DA mechanism.
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) studied a hybrid model known as house al-
location with existing tenants. In their model, some agents each initially owns one
object and some objects are social endowments. They proposed the so-called “you
request my house-I get your turn (YRMH-IGYT)” algorithm to find the allocation.
So¨nmez and U¨nver (2010) characterized the YRMH-IGYT rules by individual ra-
tionality, Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, weak neutrality (i.e., the labeling of
unowned objects has no effect on the outcome of the mechanism), and consistency.
Ekici (2013) defined a property reclaim-proofness for a matching (i.e., it is robust to
blocking coalitions with respect to any conceivable interim endowments of agents)
and showed its relationships between the YRMH-IGYT rules and competitive allo-
cation.
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Pa´pai (2000) extended Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm used in the housing
market model to more general environments by allowing some agents to initially own
more than one object and each object is owned by some agent. She constructed
a class of rules known as hierarchical exchange rules and showed that an allocation
rule that is Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof, and reallocation-proof (i.e., no pair
of agent can jointly misreport their preferences and swap their assignments ex post
to make at least one of them strictly better off) if and only if it is a hierarchical
exchange rule. A hierarchical exchange rule also utilizes the top trading cycles to
find the allocation. Each rule is defined by an inheritance structure which specifies
who initially owns and who potentially inherits what. The formal definition of the
hierarchical exchange rules is introduced in chapter 2. To distinguish the top trading
cycles used in Shapley and Scarf’s housing market where each agent initially owns
one object and the top trading cycles used in Pa´pai’s (2000) hierarchical exchange
rules where some agent may initially own more than one object, we refer to the former
as the top trading cycles from individual endowments. For a hierarchical exchange
rule, if each agent initially owns one object, then it is a top trading cycles rule from
individual endowments; if one agent initially owns all the objects, the second agent
inherits all the remaining objects after the first agent chooses, the third agent inherits
all the remaining objects after the second agent chooses, and so forth, then it is a
serial dictatorship; if different objects have possibly different inheritance orderings
of agents, then it is a Ergin’s priority rule.
Velez (2014) studied the set of consistent hierarchical exchange rules. He defined
the CHE rules, showed the equivalence of the CHE rules and consistent hierarchical
exchange rules, and proved that the CHE rules are the only rules that are efficient
in two-agent problems, consistent in two-agent problems, and strategy-proof. Tang
and Zhang (2016) redefined individual rationality and the strict core for Pa´pai’s
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hierarchical exchange rules. They characterized these rules by Pareto efficiency,
strategy-proofness and their newly defined individual rationality. They also showed
that the hierarchical exchange rule selects the unique strict core allocation.
Pycia and U¨nver (2016a) generalized Pa´pai’s hierarchical exchange rules by al-
lowing at most one agent to be a broker who brokers only one object, or allowing
all the three remaining objects to be brokered by three agents. The assignment is
formed by running the same top trading cycles algorithm as a hierarchical exchange
rule with the additional requirement that a broker may not be allowed to points to
herself if her favorite object is her brokered object. They call such an allocation rule
as a trading cycles rule. The formal definition of the trading cycles rules could be
found in chapter 3 when the number of agents is equal to or greater than the number
of objects. When there are more objects than agents, the definition is available in
chapter 2. The trading cycles rules are quite general. They subsume the top trading
cycles from individual endowments, the serial dictatorships, and the hierarchical ex-
change rules as special cases. Surprisingly, Pycia and U¨nver showed that the trading
cycles rules are the only rules that are Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof.
1.2 Interim fairness
When we design an allocation rule, Pareto efficiency and group strategy-proofness
are among the most important properties of our concern. Pareto efficiency should
be the minimum requirement when preferences are strict. Group strategy-proofness
prevents manipulation among agents, therefore, it minimizes information searching
costs. It also does not discriminate agents who do not have access to information
and who are less able to play strategically. All the trading cycles rules, including
serial dictatorships, are both Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof. But a serial
dictatorship seems unfair in the sense that the agent at the top of the priority list is
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always guaranteed to her best choice, while the agent at the end of the list receives
her best choice only if her best choice is not the best choice of any other agent.
A Pareto efficient allocation rule cannot be ex post fair because if all agents have
the same preferences, then Pareto efficiency implies that each agent receives a dis-
tinct object. Therefore, agents cannot be treated equally. But the random serial
dictatorship seems more desirable than a deterministic allocation rule in the sense
that all agents have equal chances to be the first to choose, have equal chances to
be the second to choose, and so forth. Given a deterministic allocation rule, we
can interpret agents in the rule as “roles.” A corresponding random allocation rule
is defined by assigning agents to the “roles” via a uniform lottery. Surprisingly,
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998) showed that the random serial dictatorship is
equivalent to the top trading cycles from random endowments as their distributions
over assignments are exactly the same for a given preference profile. Pathak and
Sethuraman (2011) showed the equivalence between the random serial dictatorship
and the multiple lottery mechanism where each object independently draws a lottery
to determine agents’ priorities. Lee and Sethuraman (2011) showed that this equiva-
lence still holds for all random hierarchical exchange rules. Bade (2014) extended the
equivalence result to all random trading cycles rules. Therefore, all random trading
cycles rules are equally ex ante fair. We refer to this kind of fairness as ex ante
fairness because the expectations of outcomes are based on beliefs before knowing
who actually owns or brokers what. After knowing the realizations of the lotteries,
it is clear that a serial dictatorship is less equitable than a rule of top trading cycles
from individual endowments.
During the course of assigning students to public schools in New York City,
policymakers and parents believed that a single lottery used for all schools is less
equitable than lotteries at each school. As quoted in Pathak and Sethuraman (2011),
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a policymaker from the New York City Department of Education said:
“I cannot see how the children at the end of the line are not disenfranchised
totally if only one run takes place. I believe that one line will not be acceptable
to parents. When I answered questions about this at training sessions, (it did
come up!) people reacted that the only fair approach was to do multiple runs.”
Since no mechanism could be ex post fair, and all of the random mechanisms con-
structed from Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof rules are equally ex ante fair,
our chapter 3 tries to formally define a interim fairness property and to characterize
the set of rules that satisfies this interim fairness property without compromising
Pareto efficiency and group strategy-proofness.
Consider the following timing of the allocation mechanism:
• First: Mechanism designer picks an allocation rule including the realization of
the lottery.
• Second: Agents report their preferences.
• Third: Assignment is realized.
After knowing the realization of the lottery, i.e., after knowing which deterministic
allocation rule would be used to find the assignment, but before agents submit their
preferences, no one knows what are the true preferences. When fixing the allocation
rule and considering all possible preference profiles, we can count the number of
preference profiles that an agent, say agent i, receives her best choice. We can
also count the number of preference profiles that agent i receives her second best
choice, and so forth. If for any two agents i and j, the number of preference profiles
that agent i receives her best choice is equal to the number of preference profiles
that agent j receives her best choice, the number of preference profiles that agent
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i receives her second best choice is equal to the number of preference profiles that
agent j receives her second best choice, and so forth, then the allocation rule is
balanced. Balancedness means that if all possible preference profiles are equally
likely to occur, then a balanced deterministic allocation rule assigns all agents to
their best choices with equal probabilities, assigns all agents to their second best
choices with equal probabilities, and so forth. Unlike the previous equivalence results
which consider all possible permutations over the “roles” of a deterministic rule for
the fixed preference profile, our definition considers all possible preference profiles
for a given deterministic rule.
Our theorem 3.1 states that an allocation rule is Pareto efficient, group strategy-
proof, reallocation-proof, and balanced if and only if it is a top trading cycles rule
from individual endowments. As stated in theorem 3.2, when there are at least
four agents or just two agents, we can drop reallocation-proofness in theorem 3.1;
when there are just three agents, a deterministic allocation rule is Pareto efficient,
group strategy-proof, and balanced if and only if it is a top trading cycles rule from
individual endowments or a trading cycles rule with three brokers. We may also relax
the requirements of balancedness by only requiring all agents have equal chances to
their worst choices. We show that theorem 3.1 and theorem 3.2 still hold under the
relaxed version of balancedness. Our new characterizations of the top trading cycles
from individual endowments have important policy implications. Whenever policy
makers can freely choose any allocation rule, for the sake of interim fairness, they
should randomly assign each agent a distinct object and then use the top trading
cycles algorithm to find the allocation.
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1.3 Weak preferences
So far, we assume preferences are strict. A large literature on matching theory
assumes strict preferences. Without this assumption, many good properties fail to
hold. For example, in the marriage problem with strict preferences, stability (that is,
a matching is stable if no unmatched pair can be better off by matching each other,
and no matched agent can be better off by being single) implies Pareto efficiency
(Proposition 2.1 in Abdulkadirogˇlu and So¨nmez 2013). But with weak preferences,
a stable matching might fail to be Pareto efficient. For example, consider a marriage
problem with two men and two women. Each man is indifferent between the two
women, woman 2 is indifferent between two men, but woman 1 prefers man 1 to
man 2. The matching that matches man 1 to woman 2, and man 2 to woman
1 is stable, but it is not efficient. Alternatively, Pa´pai (2000) showed that group
strategy-proofness is equivalent to strategy-proofness and non-bossiness under strict
preferences; but this equivalence breaks down on the weak domain (Ehlers 2002).
Due to the undesirable properties and the complexity induced by ties, weak pref-
erences are ignored in most of the existing matching literature. But indifferences pre-
vail in the real world. For example, in the kidney exchange problem (Roth, So¨nmez,
and U¨nver 2004), each patient-donor pair wants to exchange for a compatible kidney
from another patient-donor pair. If their preferences are based on checklist criteria
such as blood and tissue types, then different kidneys with the same criteria should
be regarded as indifferent. Another example is the school choice problem (Erdil and
Ergin 2008) which consists of a set of students and a set of public schools with limited
numbers of seats. Each school has a priority ranking over students. The ranking is
determined by local laws and educational policies. Such priorities are weak orderings
and the indifference classes are quite large.
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When we design allocation mechanisms for house allocation problems, in addition
to the minimum requirement of efficiency or weak efficiency, we also want agents to
truthfully reveal their preferences. In the two-sided matching problems even with
strict preferences, efficiency and strategy-proofness are incompatible. Fortunately,
in the one-sided matching problems, positive results exist. Recently, Alcalde-Unzu
and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) defined two different class-
es of rules that are Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and individual rational for the
housing market problem when indifferences are allowed. Ehlers (2014) provided a
characterization for top trading cycles with fixed tie-breaking for the housing mar-
ket problems with indifference by individual rationality, strategy-proofness, weak
efficiency, non-bossiness, and consistency.
In chapter 4, we study the serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking when in-
differences are allowed. We show that it satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, strategy-
proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency; moreover, it is not Pareto dominated by
any Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rule. As a corollary to Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez (1998), the equivalence between the random serial dictatorship and the top
trading cycles algorithm from random endowments still holds when we use fixed
tie-breaking or random tie-breaking.
The remaining dissertation is organized as follows: chapter 2 surveys axiomatic
approaches to house allocation problems; chapter 3 introduces a new property that
we call “balancedness,” and we characterize the set of allocation rules that satisfies
this new fairness property as well as the efficiency and incentive properties; chapter
4 discusses the serial dictatorships with fixed tie-breaking; and chapter 5 concludes.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Relationship between various allocation rules
The seminal work on house allocation problems was written by Shapley and
Scarf (1974). They introduced the so-called housing marking model in which each
trader initially owns one house and can possibly trade it for a better one in the
market. The question they were interested in is whether the strict core allocation
defined by weak dominance exists. They showed that the strict core always exists
when preferences are strict. They proposed a simple algorithm known as top trading
cycles which was invented David Gale to find an allocation in the strict core. Since
then, Roth and Postlewaite (1977), Roth (1982a), Bird (1984), Ma (1994), among
others, studied properties of the top trading cycles algorithm. Specifically, Ma (1994)
characterized top trading cycles rules by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality and
strategy-proofness.
Unlike the housing market model, all objects could be initially owned by a social
planner and she determines a priority ranking of agents. Agents choose their best
choices sequentially according to the priority ranking. This allocation rule is called
a serial dictatorship. Svensson (1999) characterized serial dictatorships by strategy-
proofness, non-bossiness and neutrality. Ergin (2002) generalized the serial dictator-
ship by allowing each distinct object type to have multiple copies (for example, each
school has multiple seats for students) and different object types may have differen-
t priority rankings of agents. Ergin studied deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism,
defined a property of acyclicity for priority structure, and showed the equivalence
between acyclical priority, Pareto efficient DA mechanism, group strategy-proof DA
mechanism, and consistent DA mechanism.
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Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) studied a hybrid model in which some a-
gents each initially owns one object and some objects are social endowment. The
proposed the so-called you request my house-I get your turn (YRMH-IGYT) algo-
rithm to find the allocation. So¨nmez and U¨nver (2010) charactized YRMH-IGYT
rules by individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, weakly neutral-
ity, and consistency. Ekici (2013) defined a property reclaim-proofness and showed
its relationship between YRMH-IGYT rules and competitive allocation.
Pa´pai (2000) extended Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm used in housing mar-
ket model to more general environments by allowing some agents to initially own
more than one object and each object is owned by some agent. She constructed a
class of rules known as hierarchical exchange rules and characterized these rules by
Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and reallocation-proofness. Velez (2014)
studied the set of consistent hierarchical exchange rules. He defined the CHE rules,
showed the equivalence of the CHE rules and consistent hierarchical exchange rules,
and proved that the CHE rules are only rules that are 2-efficient, 2-consistent, and
strategy-proof. Tang and Zhang (2016) redefined individual rationality and the core
for Pa´pai’s model. They characterized hierarchical exchange rules by individual
rationality, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness. They also showed that the
hierarchical exchange rule selects the unique core allocation.
Pycia and U¨nver (2016a) modified the top trading cycles algorithm by allowing
at most one agent to be a broker who brokers only one object when there are more
objects than agents. The assignment is formed by running the same top trading
cycles algorithm as a hierarchical exchange rule with the additional requirement
that the broker points to her favorite object owned by others. Such allocation rules
are called trading cycles rules. Surprisingly, they characterized the trading cycles
rules by Pareto efficiency and group strategy-proofness.
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The following figure 2.1 shows the relationship between various allocation rules.
Rules with owners and an broker
Pycia and U¨nver 2016a
Generalized rules with social and private endowment
Pycia and U¨nver 2016a
Special case: house allocation with existing tenants
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1999, etc.
Rules with only owners
Pa´pai 2000, Velez 2014, etc.
Individual endowments
(Housing market)
Shapley and Scarf 1974
etc.
Priorities
Ergin 2002
Dictatorships
Svensson 1999
Figure 2.1: Relationship between various allocation rules
The remaining chapter is organized from general models to specific ones. Section
2.2 introduces the notation for general models. Section 2.3 describes the trading cy-
cles. Section 2.4 discusses models without brokers, including models with social and
private endowments, the hierarchical exchange, the top trading cycles from individual
endowments, and Ergin’s priority rules and serial dictatorship.
2.2 The model
Let N be the set of agents and O be the set of objects. We assume there are
more objects than agents unless otherwise mentioned. Each agent i has a strict
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preference relation over O, denoted by Pi. Let Ri be the weak preference relation
associated with Pi, i.e., for all o, o
′ ∈ O, oRio′ if and only if o = o′ or oPio′. The
set of strict preference relations for agent i is Pi. For any J ⊆ N , PJ is the set of
preference relations for all agents j ∈ J . A preference profile P = (Pi)i∈N is an
element from P ≡ PN . PJ = (Pi)i∈J is the restriction of P to J . Let P−i denote
PN\{i}. We do not consider outside options, and assume all objects are acceptable
to all agents.
A house allocation problem (Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979) consists of N ,
O, and P . The outcome of a house allocation problem is simply a allocation (or
an matching), denoted by µ, such that each agent receives a distinct object, i.e.,
µ : N → O is an injective (one-to-one) function. Let µi be the assignment of
agent i at matching µ. Let M denote the set of all matchings. A submatching
σ is a restriction of a matching to a subset of agents. Let S be the set of all
submatchings. For any σ ∈ S, let Nσ be the set of matched agents and Oσ be
the set of matched objects under σ. For each i ∈ Nσ, let σ(i) denote the assigned
object of agent i. For each o ∈ Oσ, let σ(o) denote the agent that receives o. Let
Nσ be N \Nσ, Oσ be O \ Oσ, and M be S \M. And the set of submatchings that
objects o is unmatched is denoted by S−o.
Fixed N and O, the domain of all problems is the set of preference profiles. An
allocation rule ϕ : P →M is function that assigns a matching for each problem.
2.3 Trading cycles
Pycia and U¨nver (2016a) defined trading cycles rules by novelly introducing brok-
age right.
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Definition. A control rights structure is a collection of functions
{
(cσ, bσ) : Oσ → Nσ × {ownership, brokerage}
}
σ∈M .
A control rights structure specifies at each submatching σ each unmatched object
o ∈ Oσ is controlled by a unique unmatched agent cσ(o). The type of control
bσ(o) = ownership if agent cσ(o) owns o at σ, and bσ(o) = brokerage if agent cσ(o)
brokers o at σ.
A trading cycles rule have to satisfy the following requirements R1 to R6.
Within-round Requirements. For any σ ∈M,
(R1) There exists at most one brokered object at σ.
(R2) If i is the only unmatched agent at σ, then i owns all unmatched objects at
σ.
(R3) If agent i brokers an object at σ, then i does not own or broker any other
objects at σ.
Across-round Requirements. For any σ ⊂ σ′ ∈ M, if agent i ∈ Nσ′ owns
object o ∈ Oσ′ at σ, then:
(R4) Agent i owns o at σ′.
(R5) If i′ brokers object o′ at σ and i′ ∈ Nσ′ , o′ ∈ Oσ′ , then i′ brokers o′ at σ′.
(R6) If agent i′ ∈ Nσ′ controls o′ ∈ Oσ′ at σ, then i′ owns o at σ ∪ {(i, o′)}.
Requirement R4 postulates that ownership rights are persistent: if agent i owns
an object at a smaller submatching, and agent i is unmatched at a larger submatch-
ing, then agent i still owns the object at the larger submatching. Requirement R5
is a counterpart of R4 for brokage right. It implies that the brokage right persists
whenever there is at least one owner at the base submatching σ. The loss of bro-
kerage right can only happen when there is no owner at the base submatching σ.
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In this case, R2 implies that the unmatched agent owns all unmatched objects. Re-
quirement R6 assumes that when an agent i is matched with an object controlled by
i′, then i′ owns the objects previously owned by i.
A trading cycles (TC) rule consists of a finite sequence of rounds described
below, with a structure of control rights satisfying requirements R1-R6. We set null
submatching σ0 = ∅ and construct submatchings σr of matched agents and objects
before round r + 1 for all r = 1, 2, 3, · · · . Each round r consists of three steps:
• Pointing step. Each object o ∈ Oσr−1 points to the agent who controls it at
σr−1. Each owner in Nσr−1 points to her favorite object among Oσr−1 . If there
is a broker in Nσr−1 , she points to her favorite object among objects owned at
σr−1.
• Trading step. As the number of agents is finite, each agent points to one object,
and each object points to one agent, there exists an integer number n and a
trading cycle consisting of a set of agents {i1, i2, · · · , in} ⊆ Nσr−1 and a set of
objets {o1, o2, · · · , on} ⊆ Oσr−1 such that ol points to il, il points to ol+1 for all
l = 1, 2, · · · , n, and on+1 = o1, i.e., o1 → i1 → o2 → · · · → on → in → o1. No
two trading cycles intersect. Each agent in a trading cycle is matched with the
object she points to.
• Departure step. Newly matched agents and objects are removed from Nσr−1 and
Oσr−1 . Submatching σ
r is the union of σr−1 and newly matched agent-object
pairs. The algorithm stops when all agents are matched. The submatching
formed at the last round is the outcome of the TC rule.
Example. Consider an economy with three agents 1, 2, 3, four objects a, b, c, d,
and a control-right structure that at submatching ∅, 1 brokers a, 2 owns b and c, and
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3 owns d, respectively. Suppose each agent i has the preference relation aPibPicPid
for all i = 1, 2, 3. Then in the first round 1 points to b, and 2 and 3 both point to
a. A trading cycle “1 → b → 2 → a → 1” exists. 1 is matched with b and 2 is
matched with a. In the second round, 3 owns c and d and she is matched with c.
The algorithm stops.
Definition. An matching µ ∈M is Pareto efficient if there exists no matching
µ′ ∈ M such that for all i ∈ N , µ′iRiµi, and there exists some agent j ∈ N , µ′jPjµj.
An allocation rule is Pareto efficient if it selects a Pareto efficient matching for
each problem.
Definition. An allocation rule ϕ is strategy-proof is truthfully revealing one’s
preference is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent, i.e., for all i ∈ N , all P ∈ P ,
and all P ′i ∈ Pi, ϕi(P )Riϕi(P ′i , P−i). An allocation rule ϕ is group strategy-proof
if no group of agent can jointly misreport their preferences to make all agents in the
group are weakly better off and some agent in the group are strictly better off, i.e.,
for all P ∈ P , there exists no J ⊆ N and P ′J ∈ PJ such that ϕi(P )Riϕi(P ′J , PN\J)
for all i ∈ J , and ϕj(P )Pjϕj(P ′J , PN\J) for some j ∈ J .
Theorem (Theorem 1 in Pycia and U¨nver 2016a): An allocation rule is Pareto
efficient and group strategy-proof if and only if it is a trading cycles rule.
For any allocation rule, we call an agent an owner* of an object if she obtains
the object whenever she ranks it first; we call an agent a broker* of an object if she
obtains her second best choice among all preference profiles such that all agents rank
the brokered object first. To show the only if part of theorem, the authors construct
a TC rule that is equivalent to the Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof rule. To
prove that this construction finds all candidates, it is necessary to check that each
unmatched object is either owned* or brokered*, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem (Theorem 2 in Pycia and U¨nver 2016a): For any Pareto efficient and
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group strategy-proof rule, for any submatching σ, each unmatched object at σ is
either owned* or brokered* by some unique agent.
2.4 Models without brokers
2.4.1 Generalized model with social and private endowment
Let O = {Oi}i∈{0}∪N be a collection of pairwise-disjointed subsets of O such that
∪i∈{0}∪NOi = O. O0 is social endowment of agents, Oi is private endowment of agent
i. Some agents may have empty private endowment.
Definition. A matching is individually rational if the assignment of each
agent is weakly preferred to any object that she could choose from her private en-
dowment. An allocation rule is individually rational if it finds an individually
rational matching for each problem.
The following theorem is corollary of theorem 1 in Pycia and U¨nver (2016a).
Theorem (Theorem 3 in Pycia and U¨nver 2016a): An allocation rule is indi-
vidually rational, Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof if and only if it is an
individually rational trading cycles rule.
The following theorem identifies individually rational trading cycles rule.
Theorem (Theorem 4 in Pycia and U¨nver 2016a): An trading cycles rule is
individually rational if and only if it may be represented by a persistent structure
of control rights in which each agent has the initial ownership rights over all objects
from her endowment.
As a corollary, the following theorem characterize the top trading cycles.
Theorem (Theorem 5 in Pycia and U¨nver 2016a): Suppose each agent’s endow-
ment is nonempty. An allocation rule is individually rational, Pareto efficient, and
group strategy-proof if and only if it is a top trading cycles rule that assigns all
agents the initial ownership rights over objects from their endowment.
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A special case of the generalized model without a broker is a house allocation
problem with existing tenants (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1999) where some
agents (existing tenants) each initially owns one object (an occupied house) and un-
owned objects (vacant houses) are social endowment. They proposed two allocation
rules to find the matching. One is a top trading cycles rule with a priority
ordering of agents over the set of unowned objects (TTC with a priority ordering).
It consists of a serial of steps:
• At step 1, the set of available objects is the set of unowned objects.
• At step t, the set of available objects is the remaining previously unowned
objects at the end of step t−1. Each remaining agent points to her best choice
among the remaining objects. Each remaining owned object (an occupied
house) points to its owner (an existing tenant). And each available object
points to the remaining agent with the highest priority. This algorithm is just
a special case of trading cycles algorithm without a broker. The definition
of cycles and the submatchings formed in this step are similar to that of the
trading cycles rule.
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) showed that the TTC with a priority ordering
satisfies good properties.
Theorem (Theorem 1 in Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1999): Fix a priority or-
dering, the TTC with the priority ordering is individually rational, Pareto efficient,
and strategy-proof.
The other allocation rule that Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) proposed is the
you request my house-I get your turn (YRMH-IGYT) algorithm described
below.
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1. For any priority ordering, match the agent with the highest priority her best
choice, the agent with the second highest priority her best choice among the
remaining one, and so forth, until the object is owned by some owner (an
existing tenant).
2. If at some point, the owner whose owned object is demanded is already matched,
then step 1 proceeds. Otherwise reorder the priority ordering by adding this
owner at the top of the remaining priority ordering and proceed.
3. Similarly, add any owner whose owned object is demanded to the top of the
remaining priority ordering and proceed.
4. If at any point a cycle consisting only of owners exists, then match each agent in
a cycle her best choice among the remaining ones, remove them, and proceed.
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) showed the equivalence of the TTC algorithm
and YRMH-IGYT algorithm.
Theorem (Theorem 3 in Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1999): Fix a priority or-
dering, the TTC with the priority ordering and the YRMH-IGYT with the priority
ordering find the same matching.
So¨nmez and U¨nver (2010) provided a characterization of YRMH-IGYT mecha-
nism. Before introducing their result, we introduce some axioms used in their result.
Definition. An allocation rule is weakly neutral if labeling of unowned objects
(vacant houses) has no effect on the outcome of the mechanism.
Definition. An allocation rule ϕ is consistent for the house allocation problem
with existing tenants if we remove a set of agents J along with their matched objects
and some unmatched objects G, provided that the remaining problem is a well-
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defined reduced problem, then
ϕi
(
P
O\{ϕJ (P )∪G}
N\J
)
= ϕi(P ), ∀i ∈ N \ J,
where P
O\{ϕJ (P )∪G}
N\J is the restricted preference relations of agents in N \ J over the
set of objects O \ {ϕJ(P ) ∪G}.
Theorem (Theorem 1 in So¨nmez and U¨nver 2010): An allocation rule is Pareto-
efficient, individually rational, strategy-proof, weakly neutral, and consistent if and
only if it is a YRMH-IGYT rule.
Ekici (2013) defined a new property called reclaim-proofness and established a
link between reclaim-proof allocations and the class of YRMH-IGYT mechanisms.
Definition. An interim endowment function ω of an allocation µ satisfies
ω(o) ∈ {the agent who initially owns o, the agent who is matched with o at µ, the
social planner} for all o. An allocation is reclaim-proof if it is robust to blocking
coalitions with respect to every interim endowment function of µ.
Theorem (Theorem 1 and 2 in Ekici 2013): An allocation is reclaim-proof if
and only if it is induced by a YRMH-IGYT mechanism and if and only if it is a
competitive allocation.
2.4.2 Hierarchical exchange
A hierarchical exchange rule defined by Pa´pai (2000) is a TC rule without a
broker. To define a hierarchical exchange rule, we can simplify the control rights
structure to the ownership rights structure.
Definition. A ownership rights structure is a collection of functions {cσ :
Oσ → Nσ}σ∈M denoted by {cσ} for short. It specifies that at each submatching each
unmatched object is owned by a unique unmatched agent. The ownership rights
structure is persistent if for all submatchings σ ⊆ σ′ ∈ M, if agent i and object o
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are unmatched at σ′, and i owns o at σ, then i owns o at σ′, i.e., if i ∈ Nσ′ owns
o ∈ Oσ′ at σ, then i owns o at σ′. For each submatching σ and each unmatched
object o, we write cσ(o) = i if agent i owns o at submatching σ.
Definition. Each persistent structure of ownership rights defines a hierarchical
exchange rule. A fixed endowment allocation rule is a hierarchical exchange
rule satisfying cσ(o) = cσ′(o) for all o, and for all σ and σ such that Nσ = Nσ′ .
Pa´pai (2000) defined inheritance trees to describe this persistent TC rule without
brokerage right. An inheritance tree of an object specifies who initially owns and
who potentially becomes new owner of the object at different submatchings formed
when the algorithm proceeds.
An inheritance tree of an object a denoted by Γa consists of a set of vertices V
and a set of arcs Q ⊆ V × V . A arc (vi, vj) ∈ Q for vi, vj ∈ V if there is an arrow
from vi to vj. A Q-path from v1 to vr is a sequence {vs}rs=1, where r ≥ 2, such that
(vs, vs+1) ∈ Q. There exists a vertex v0 ∈ V which is the unique root of Γa, that is,
there exists no vertex v ∈ V such that (v, v0) ∈ Q.
A well-defined inheritance tree Γa satisfies the following requirements.
(A.1) All vertices are labeled by individuals.
(A.2) Every vertex of a Q-path represents a different individual.
(B.1) All arcs are labeled by objects other than a.
(B.2) Every arc of a Q-path represents a different object.
(B.3) Arcs from the same vertex represent different objects.
(C.1) maxv∈V d(v0, v) = m− 1, where m = min{|N |, |O|}.
(C.2) The number of arcs starting from v0 is |O| − 1.
(C.3) For all v ∈ V such that there is a Q-path from v0 to v, with d(v0, v) = r <
m− 1, the number of arcs starting from v is |O| − r − 1.
If a path of the tree for an object (say o1) is i1
o2→ i2 o3→ i3 o4→ · · ·
o|N|→ i|N |, then i1
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initially owns o1; if i1 is assigned o2, then i2 inherits o1; if i1 is assigned o2, and i2 is
assigned o3, then i3 inherits o1, etc.
Definition. An allocation rule ϕ is non-bossy if no agent can misreport her
preference to make her allocation unchanged but change the allocation of some other
agent, i.e., for all P ∈ P and all P ′i ∈ Pi, ϕi(P ′i , P−i) = ϕi(P ) implies ϕ(P ′i , P−i) =
ϕ(P ).
Theorem (Lemma 1 in Pa´pai 2000): An allocation rule is strategy-proof and
non-bossy if and only if it is group strategy-proof.
Definition. An allocation rule ϕ is reallocation-proof if no pair of agent can
jointly misreport their preferences and swap their assignments ex post to make at
least one of them strictly better off, i.e., there exists no i, j ∈ N such that for
some P ∈ P , P ′i ∈ Pi and P ′j ∈ Pj with ϕ(P ′i , P−i) = ϕ(P ′j , P−j) = ϕ(P ), we have
ϕi(P
′
i , P
′
j , PN\{i,j})Piϕi(P ) and ϕj(P
′
i , P
′
j , PN\{i,j})Rjϕi(P ).
The following theorem characterizes the hierarchical exchange rules.
Theorem (Theorem 1 in Pa´pai 2000): An allocation rule is Pareto efficient, group
strategy-proof, and reallocation-proof if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule.
Velez (2014) studied the set of consistent hierarchical exchange rules. He defined
CHE rules, showed the equivalence of CHE rules and consistent hierarchical exchange
rules, and characterized the CHE rules.
Definition. CHE-1 rules. Let Π1 ≡ (pil)ml=1 be a partition of agents into sets
of at most two agents and |pim| = 1. Let T1 : O × Π1 → N be a function such that
for Ti(O, pi) = pi for all pi ∈ Π1. For each o ∈ O, the CHE-1 rule satisfies:
C1-1: Between two agents who belong to two different components of Π1, the one
who belongs to the component with the smaller index inherits o first.
C1-2: Between two agents who belong to the same component of Π1, say pil, agent
T1(o, pil) inherits o first.
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Definition. CHE-2 rules. Let Π2 ≡ (pil)ml=1 be a partition of agents into sets
of at most two agents and |pim| = 2. Let T2 : O×Π2 \ {pim} → N be a function such
that T2(O, pi) = pi for all pi ∈ Π2. Let Q : O2 \ {(o, o) : x ∈ O} → pim be an onto
function. For each o ∈ O, the CHE-2 rule satisfies:
C2-1 Between two agents who belong to two different components of Π2 the one
who belongs to the component with the smaller index, inherits o first.
C2-2 Between two agents who belong to the same component of Π2 \ {pim}, say pil,
agent T2(o, pil) inherits o first.
C2-3 If pim ⊆ N , then for each o ∈ O and each leaf edge of γO\{o} (i.e. an end arc
in a tree), say e, we have that Γo(p(e)) = Q(o, ς(e)), where p(e) is the vertex that
connects e and the end vertex, and ς(e) is the labelling of e.
Definition. CHE-3 rules. Let Π3 ≡ (pil)ml=1 be a partition of agents into sets
of at most two agents and the last three sets in the partition are singletons. Let
T3 : O × Π3 \ {pim−2, pim−1, pim} → N be a function such that T3(O, pi) = pi for all
pi ∈ Π3 \ {pim−2, pim−1, pim}. Let Q : O2 \ {(o, o) : x ∈ O} → pim be an onto function.
Let ω ∈ O and Y ⊆ O \{ω} be non-empty. For each o ∈ O, the CHE-3 rule satisfies:
C3-1: Between agent in
⋃m−3
l=1 pil who belong to two different components, the
one who belongs to the component with the smaller index, inherits o first. Moreover,
each agent in
⋃m−3
l=1 pil inherits o before each agent in
⋃m
l=m−2 pil.
C3-2: Between two agents in
⋃m−3
l=1 pil, who belong to the same component of Π3,
say pil, agent T3(o, pil) inherits o first.
C3-3: For that last three agents, im−2 inherits o before im−1 if and only if o 6= ω.
C3-4: im−1 inherits o before im.
C3-5: If {im−1, im} ⊆ N , then for each o ∈ O and each leaf edge of γO\{o}, say e,
we have that Γo(p(e)) = im if and only if o ∈ Y and ς(e) = ω.
Definition. A rule is a CHE rule if it belongs to one of the three classes defined
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above.
Theorem (Lemma 1 in Velez 2014): CHE rules are consistent.
Definition. A rule is 2-efficient if it is efficient for each two-agent problem. A
rule is 2-consistent if it is consistent for each two-agent problem.
Theorem (Theorem 1 in Velez 2014): In a variable population and variable
resource environment with at least four objects, a rule is 2-efficient, 2-consistent,
and strategyproof if and only if it is a CHE rule.
Theorem (Propositin 1 in Velez 2014): In a variable population and variable re-
source environment with at least four objects, the following statements of a allocation
rule ϕ are equivalent.
1. ϕ is a CHE rule.
2. ϕ is a consistent HE rule.
3. ϕ is a 2-consistent HE rule.
4. ϕ is a consistent TC rule.
5. ϕ is a 2-consistent TC rule.
6. ϕ is efficient, consistent, and strategy-proof.
Theorem (Theorem 2 in Velez 2014): In a variable population and variable
resource environment with at least four objects, A rule is 2-efficient, 2-consistent,
and conversely consistent if and only if it is a CHE-1 or a CHE-2 rule.
Tang and Zhang (2016) generalized the definition of individual rationality for the
hierarchical exchange rules and provided a new characterization for these rules.
Definition. Given an inheritance structure {cσ}, the induced set of feasible
submatchings denoted by Fc is a subset of S such that:
1. ∅ ∈ Fc;
2. σ ∈ Fc if there exists σ′ ∈ Fc with σ′ ( σ such that σ is minimal in {σ˜ : σ′ (
σ˜, and Oσ˜ \Oσ′ ⊂ cσ′(Nσ˜ \Nσ′)}.
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Condition 2 implies that a submatching is feasible only if it is a minimal enlarge-
ment of a feasible submatching that satisfies persistency. The following theorem
illustrates the structure of the set of feasible submatchings.
Theorem (Proposition 1 in Tang and Zhang 2016): Let σ, σ′ ∈ Fc.
1. If σ ⊂ σ′, then Oσ′ \Oσ ⊆ cσ(Nσ′ \Nσ).
2. If σ, σ′ are both submatchings of a matching, then σ ∩ σ′, σ ∪ σ′ ∈ Fc.
Given a matching µ and an agent i, the above result implies that there exists a
maximal feasible submatching of µ denoted by σmax(µ \ i) that does not include i.
Definition. The contingent endowment of agent i at a matching µ is defined
as the set of objects that i would be endowed with a the contingency that the maximal
submatching of µ that excludes i has been removed, i.e., ω(i|µ) = σmax(µ \ i)(i).
Definition. Agent i is individually rational at matching µ if µiRio for all
o ∈ ω(i|µ). An allocation rule is individually rational rational if it always finds
an individually rational allocation.
Theorem (Theorem 1 in Tang and Zhang 2016): An allocation rule is Pareto
efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof if and only if it is a hierarchical
exchange rule.
Tang and Zhang (2016) also generalized the definition of core defined by Shapley
and Scarf (1974) to hierarchical exchange rules.
Definition. A matching µ is in the core of house allocation problem with a
persistent ownership structure if there do not exist any coalition B ∈ N and matching
ν such that
1. νi /∈ ω(j|ν), for all i ∈ B and all j ∈ N \B.
2. νiRiµi for all i ∈ B, and νjPjµj for some j ∈ B.
Theorem (Theorem 2 in Tang and Zhang 2016): For any house allocation prob-
lem with a persistent structure of ownership, the hierarchical exchange rule selects
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the unique core allocation.
2.4.3 Top trading cycles from individual endowments
A housing market problem (Shapley and Scarf 1974) is a four-tuple (N,O, P, ω)
with |N | = |O|, where matching ω is the initial endowment.
Definition. An allocation µ ∈M belongs to the weak core denoted by C(P ) if
there is no submarket that could have done strictly better for all its members, i.e.,
if there does not exist a set of agents S ⊆ N and a matching µ′ ∈M such that
1. For all i ∈ S, µ′iPiµi and
2. {µ′i|i ∈ S} = {ωi|i ∈ S}.
Definition. An allocation µ ∈M belongs to the strict core denoted by SC(P )
if there is no submarket that could make at least one agent in the group strictly
better off, while the others in the group are not worse off, i.e., if there does not exist
a set of agents S ⊆ N and a matching µ′ ∈M such that
1. For all i ∈ S, µ′iRiµi, and for some j ∈ S, µ′jPjµj.
2. {µ′i|i ∈ S} = {ωi|i ∈ S}.
Example. The following example shown in table 2.1 illustrates that the weak
core and strict core are not equivalent even under strict preferences.
P1 P2 P3
o3 o1 o2
o2 o2 o3
o1 o3 o1
Table 2.1: Weak core 6= strict core.
When ω = (o1, o2, o3), the boxed allocation is in weak core but not in the strict
core.
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Shapley and Scarf (1974) utilized Scarf’s theorem to show that strict core always
exists. They also provided a constructive way by using Gale’s top trading cycles
algorithm to find an allocation in the strict core. Top trading cycles algorithm
from individual endowments is a special case of the hierarchical exchange rules in
which each agent is initially endowed with exact one object. A top trading cycles
algorithm from individual endowments consists of a serial of round. At each
round t, each remaining object points to its owner, and each remaining agent points
to her favorite object among the remaining ones. A set of agents forms a cycle
whenever their favorite objects among the remaining ones are the objects owned
by the agents in this set. At least one cycle exists. Assign each agent in a cycle
the object she points to and remove the assigned agents along with their assigned
objects. The algorithm stops when all agents are assigned.
Theorem (Shapley and Scarf 1974): The strict core exists when preferences are
strict. The top trading cycles algorithm finds an allocation in the strict core.
It is clear that the strict core is a subset of the weak core. The weak core
always exists, even under weak preferences. However, Shapley and Scarf (1974) also
illustrated that strict core may not exist when preferences are not strict, as shown
in the following example.
Example. Let ω = (o1, o2, o3). The preferences are given in table 2.2. For all
possible allocations, none of them is in the strict core defined by weak dominance.
P1 P2 P3
o2 o1, o3 o2
o1, o3 o2 o1, o3
Table 2.2: Strict core many not exist
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So¨nmez (1999) studied a general class of allocation problems that includes housing
markets, marriage problems, roommate problems, networks, etc. He showed that the
strict core, if it exists, is essentially single-valued.
Theorem (So¨nmez 1999): If there exists an individually rational, Pareto efficient,
and strategy-proof allocation rule ψ, then we have:
1. For all R ∈ R, for all i ∈ N , for all µ, µ′ ∈ SC(R), i is indifferent between µi
and µ′i.
2. For all R ∈ R with SC(R) 6= ∅, ψ(R) ∈ SC(R).
Roth and Postlewaite (1977) built the relationship between the strict core allo-
cation and competitive allocation.
Definition. The budget set of agent i is defined as Bi(p) = {ωj|pj ≤ pi}. A
matching µ is a competitive allocation for a housing market problem if there
exists a price vector p, for all i ∈ N , µi ∈ arg maxRi, subject to Bi(p).
Theorem (Roth and Postlewaite 1977): In a housing market model with weak
preferences, we have:
1. There exists a competitive allocation.
2. If strict core SC(R) exists, then for all µ ∈ SC(R), µ is a competitive allocation.
When preferences are strict, then:
3. If µ is a competitive allocation, then µ belongs to the strict core.
4. The set of strict core equals the set of competitive allocation and top trading
cycles algorithm finds the unique matching in the strict core.
Moreover, the strict core mechanism satisfies some remarkable incentive proper-
ties.
Theorem (Roth 1982a): In the top trading cycles procedure, it is a weakly
dominant strategy for each player to reveal his true preferences. That is, the strict
core mechanism is strategy-proof.
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Theorem (Bird 1984): In the top trading cycles procedure, no group of agent
can jointly misreport their preferences to make at least one agent in the group strictly
better off, and other agents in the group are not worse off. That is, the strict core
mechanism is group strategy-proof.
Takamiya (2001) proved the equivalence of group strategy-proofness and Maskin
monotonicity.
Definition. Fix an allocation rule ϕ, a preference profile P ′ ∈ P is a monotonic
transformation of P ∈ P if ϕi(P )Pio implies ϕi(P )P ′io for all i ∈ N and all o ∈ O,
i.e., for each agent, the set of objects better than the original profile allocation weakly
shrinks from the original profile to its transformed profile. An allocation rule ϕ is
Maskin monotonic if ϕ(P ′) = ϕ(P ) whenever P ′ is a monotonic transformation of
P .
Theorem (Takamiya 2001): An allocation rule is group strategy-proof if and
only if it is Maskin monotonic.
Ma (1994) provided a characterization of top trading cycles from individual en-
dowments.
Theorem (Ma 1994): An allocation rule for the housing market model is Pareto
efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof if and only if it is a top trading
cycles rule from individual endowments.
2.4.4 Priority rules
Ergin (2002) studied a indivisible objects model with a finite set of object types
and each type has a finite quota of objects. One interesting example is assigning
students to public schools. Each schools has a limited number of seats. Students
has strict preference over schools, but are indifferent between seats from the same
school. In the following section, we assume quota of each object type (or the number
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of seats of each school) is one, which means this is a house allocation problem. A
key component of in Ergin’s model is a vector of linear orders known as a priority
structure denoted by = (o)o∈O. The priority structure could be viewed as a
fixed endowment hierarchical inheritance ownership. The assignment is computed
via deferred acceptance algorithm invented by Gale and Shapley.
The deferred acceptance algorithm associated with a priority structure 
denoted by DA consists of a serial of steps as follows:
• At step 1: each agent applies to her favorite object. Each object temporarily
accept the applicant with the highest priority.
• In general, at step k: each agent who is rejected in the previous step applies
to favorite object among the ones that she has not applied for. Each object
temporarily accept the applicant with the highest priority among the new ap-
plicants and the applicant that she temporarily accept at step k−1, and reject
others.
• The algorithm stops when no agent applies.
Unlike the hierarchical exchange rule, the outcome of the deferred acceptance al-
gorithm may not be Pareto efficient. Ergin (2002) defined a new property of a priority
structure that is called acyclicity and showed that it is sufficient and necessary for
Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency separately. Acyclicity is
defined for a model with object types by a cycle condition and a scarcity condition.
In a house allocation problem that each type has one object, the scarcity condition
is always satisfied.
Definition. Let  be a priority structure. A cycle consists of distinct o, o′ ∈ O
and i, j, k ∈ N such that i o j o k o′ i. A priority structure is acyclical if it has
no cycles.
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Theorem (Ergin 2002): The following are equivalent.
1. DA is Pareto efficient.
2. DA is group strategy-proof.
3. DA is consistent.
4.  is acyclical.
When all objects use the same priority ordering of agents, then the deferred
acceptance algorithm is just a serial dictatorship. In the language of the hierarchical
exchange, a serial dictatorship is a special case of the hierarchical exchange rules
in which one agent owns all unmatched objects at all submatchings.
Definition. Let pi : O → O be a bijection, i.e., a permutation (or a change
of names) of objects. If µ is an allocation, piµ is defined by (piµ)(i) = pi(µ(i)) for
all i ∈ N . A preference relation pi(Ri) is defined by api(Ri)b ⇐⇒ pi(a)Ripi(b). An
allocation rule ϕ is neutral if ϕ(pi(R)) = pi(ϕ(R)).
Theorem (Svensson 1999): ϕ is strategy-proof, non-bossy, and neutral if and
only if ϕ is a serially dictatorship.
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3. BALANCED HOUSE ALLOCATION
In this chapter, we define a new property that we call “balancedness.” It is a
fairness property in the sense that if all possible preference profiles are equally likely
to happen, an allocation rule is balanced if it assigns all agents to their best choices
with equal probabilities, it assigns all agents to their second best choices with equal
probabilities, and so forth. We provide new characterizations for the top trading
cycles from individual endowments. These rules are the only rules that are Pareto
efficient, group strategy-proof, reallocation-proof, and balanced (theorem 3.1). When
the number of objects is at least four or just two, they are the only rules that
are Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof, and balanced; when there are just three
objects, an allocation rule is Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof, and balanced if
and only if it is a top trading cycles rule from individual endowments, or a trading
cycles rule with three brokers (theorem 3.2).
Previous results imply that all random allocation rules induced by some Pare-
to efficient and group strategy-proof deterministic allocation rules are equally ex
ante fair (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1998, Pathak and Sethuraman 2011, Lee and
Sethuraman 2011, Bade 2014) because before knowing the realization of the lottery,
the distribution over outcomes of a random trading cycles rule is the same as the
distribution over outcomes of the random serial dictatorship. However, it is clear
that after knowing the realization of the lottery (i.e., knowing which deterministic
allocation rule would be used to find the assignment) but before knowing agents’
true preferences, not all Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof rules assign all a-
gents to their best choices, to their second best choices, etc, with equal probabilities.
Specifically, in a serial dictatorship, the agent with the highest priority is always
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guaranteed to her best choice, while the agent with the lowest priority has a lower
chance to receive her best choice. A Pareto efficient deterministic allocation rule
cannot be ex post fair because if all agents have the same preferences, they cannot
be treated equally. Balancedness is an interim fairness property since chances that
agents receive their best choices, their second best choices, etc., are the expectations
calculated after knowing the realization of the lottery, but before knowing agents’
preferences.
The intuition of the fact that a top trading cycles rule from individual endow-
ments satisfies balancedness is symmetry: if each agent initially endows with one
object, all of them would be treated equally if all possible preference profiles are
taken into account with equal weights. We construct a bijection τ from the set of
preference profiles to itself, and show that given the top trading cycles from individ-
ual endowments, if agent i receives her kth best choice and agent j receives her lth
best choice under R, then agent i receives her lth best choice and agent j receives
her kth best choice under τ(R).
The proof of the only if part of theorem 3.1 relies on the persistence property of
the hierarchical exchange rules, i.e., once an agent owns an object, she retains it until
she is assigned. To prove the only if part of theorem 3.2, we also have to use our
proposition 3.1: given a trading cycles rule defined by Pycia and U¨nver (2016a), if
we change the rule by depriving the control right of one agent and give it to another
agent, then some agents’ gains mean other agents’ losses because the sums of the
probabilities that agents receive their best choices are the same. We may also relax
the definition of balancedness to the one where all agents have equal chances to their
worst choices. Theorem 3.1* and theorem 3.2* state that the top trading cycles
from individual endowments can be characterized by the efficiency and the incentive
properties and the relaxed version of balancedness.
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The remaining chapter is organized as follows: section 3.1 introduces our model
and defines the top trading cycles, section 3.2 presents the main result, and section
3.3 concludes.
3.1 The model
Let N ≡ {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of agents, and O ≡ {o1, o2, · · · , on} be the set
of objects. We assume the number of agents equals the number of objects. Each
agent has a strict preference relation over the set of objects. Let P be the set of
strict preference relations on O, and let PN be the set of preferences profiles. Note
that |P| = n!, and |PN | = (n!)n. We use R ≡ (Ri)i∈N ∈ PN to denote a generic
preference profile. Ri and Pi denote the weak and strong preference relation for agent
i, respectively. For any group of agents S ⊆ N , denote the preferences of the agents
in S by RS. Suppose each object is acceptable to all agents and each agent has no use
for more than one object. Each object can only be assigned to one agent and objects
have no preferences. An assignment µ is a matching such that each agent receives
a distinct object. Let µi be the object assigned to agent i under the µ. Let M be
the set of all possible matchings. A (deterministic) allocation rule is a mapping from
P to M. We use f to denote a generic allocation rule. fi(R) is the assignment for
agent i under R.
Examples of these problems include allocating and exchanging transplant organs,
like kidneys (Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2004), assigning students to university a-
partments (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999), etc. When Shapley and Scarf (1974)
initiate this model, they use an example of houses and traders. Since then, such
problems are now known as house allocation problems. The allocation mechanisms
in these problems are based on the top trading cycles algorithm invented by David
Gale and introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). Before describing the algorithm,
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we first introduce some properties used in our main result.
3.1.1 Axioms
A matching µ is Pareto efficient if there does not exist a matching µ′ ∈ M,
such that some agent is strictly better off while others are not worse off. That is,
∀µ′ ∈ M, µ′iPiµi for some i ∈ N implies µjPjµ′j for some j ∈ N . An allocation rule
f is Pareto efficient if it always selects a Pareto efficient matching, i.e., ∀R ∈ PN ,
f(R) is Pareto efficient matching.
An allocation rule f is strategy-proof if truthfully revealing her preference is a
weakly dominant strategy for each agent, i.e., ∀i, ∀Ri, R′i ∈ P , fi(R)Rifi(R′i, RN\{i}).
A stronger version of strategy-proofness is group strategy-proof which means no
group of agents can be weakly better off by misreporting their preferences, i.e., ∀
R ∈ PN , there exists no S ⊆ N and R′S ∈ PS, such that fi(R′S, RN\S)Rifi(R) for all
i ∈ S, and fj(R′S, RN\S)Pj fj(R) for some j ∈ S.
An allocation rule ϕ is reallocation-proof if no two agents can jointly misreport
their preferences and swap their assignments ex post to make at least one of them
strictly better off, i.e., there exist no i, j ∈ N such that for some R ∈ PN , R′i ∈ P and
R′j ∈ P with ϕ(R′i, R−i) = ϕ(R′j, R−j) = ϕ(R), we have ϕi(R′i, R′j, RN\{i,j})Piϕi(P )
and ϕj(R
′
i, R
′
j, RN\{i,j})Rjϕi(R).
3.1.2 Top trading cycles algorithm
Shapley and Scarf (1974) initiated a model where each agent owns one house and
can trade it for a better one in the market. They showed that the strict core (in the
sense that there is no submarket such that all agents in a group can be weakly better
off and some agent can be strictly better off by reallocating their initial endowments)
is nonempty, and the top trading cycles (TTC) algorithm finds an allocation in the
strict core. To distinguish the TTC used in Shapley and Scarf’s housing market
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model from the TTC used in Pa´pai (2000)’s hierarchical exchange rules where some
agents may initially own more than one object, we refer to the former as the TTC
from individual endowments. It consists of a list of steps described below.
• At the beginning of step 1: each agent owns exactly one object.
• At step 1: each agent points to the agent who owns her favorite object. A list
of agents {i1, i2, · · · , ik} forms a cycle if agent il points to agent il+1 for all
l = 1, 2, · · · , k, and ik+1 = i1. An agent points to herself also forms a cycle.
Because each agent points (as all objects are acceptable) and the number of
agents is finite, at least one cycle exists. And no two cycles intersect since
preferences are strict. Remove all cycles from the market and assign each
agent in a cycle her best choice.
• In general, at step k: each remaining agent points to the agent who owns
her best choice among the remaining objects. Again, there exists one cycle.
Remove all cycles from the market and assign each agent in a cycle her best
choice among the remaining objects.
• The algorithm stops when all agents are removed from the market. Note that
the algorithm stops in no more than n steps since at least one agent is removed
at each step.
Roth and Postlewaite (1977) proved that the TTC from individual endowments
finds the unique matching in the strict core. Roth (1982a) showed that TTC from in-
dividual endowments is strategy-proof. Bird (1984) showed that it is group strategy-
proof. Ma (1994) characterized the strict core mechanism by Pareto efficiency, in-
dividual rationality (one’s assignment is at least as good as her endowment), and
strategy-proofness.
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3.2 The result
Let f be a deterministic allocation rule. For any i ∈ N , define
#(1, i) ≡ ∣∣{R ∈ PN : fi(R) is the best in Ri}∣∣ ;
· · ·
#(k, i) ≡ ∣∣{R ∈ PN : fi(R) is the kth best in Ri}∣∣ ;
· · ·
#(n, i) ≡ ∣∣{R ∈ PN : fi(R) is the worst in Ri}∣∣ .
Given an allocation rule f , we define #(k, i) as the number of preference profiles
that agent i receives her kth best choice for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n, and all i ∈ N .
Example 3.1: Consider a serial dictatorship with agent t has the tth high-
est priority for all t = 1, 2, · · · , n. Then, for all (n!)n possible preference pro-
files, agent 1 always receives her best choice, so #(1, 1) = (n!)n. Agent 2 has
a chance of n−1
n
to receive her best choice and a chance of 1
n
to receive her sec-
ond best choice, so #(1, 2) = n−1
n
· (n!)n and #(2, 2) = 1
n
· (n!)n. In general, the
chance for agent t to receive her kth choice (t ≤ k) is given by P
k−1
t−1 (n−t+1)(n−k)!
n!
, so
#(k, t) = (n−t+1)(t−1)!(n−k)!
(t−k)!n! · (n!)n.
Definition: A deterministic allocation rule f is balanced if for any two agents
i, j ∈ N , and for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n, we have
#(k, i) = #(k, j).
After knowing the realization of the lottery which determines who controls what,
but before agents submit their preferences, the mechanism designer does not know
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agents’ true preferences. If each possible preference profile happens with equal prob-
ability, then a rule is balanced if all agents have equal chances to their best choices,
have equal chances to their second best choices, and so forth. So we say balanced-
ness is an interim fairness property. Although previous results show that all random
trading cycles rules (including random hierarchical exchange rules) are equally ex
ante fair in the sense that their distributions over outcomes are exactly the same
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1998, Pathak and Sethuraman 2011, Lee and Sethura-
man 2011, Bade 2014), our theorem 3.1 shows that any hierarchical exchange rule
satisfying balancedness is a TTC from individual endowments, and our theorem 3.2
shows that when there are at least four agents or just two agents, any trading cycles
rule satisfying balancedness is a TTC from individual endowments; when there are
three agents, a rule is Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof, and balanced if and
only if it is a TTC from individual endowments, or a trading cycles rule with three
brokers (see section 3.2.2 for its definition). Therefore, our theorem 3.1 and theorem
3.2 provide new characterizations of the TTC from individual endowments.
Theorem 3.1: A deterministic allocation rule is Pareto efficient, group strategy-
proof, reallocation-proof, and balanced if and only if it is a TTC from individual
endowments.
If we drop reallocation-proofness and restrict the problems to the ones with at
least four agents or just two agents, the result of theorem 3.1 still holds, as shown in
the following theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2: When |N | = |O| 6= 3, a deterministic allocation rule is Pareto
efficient, group strategy-proof, and balanced if and only if it is a TTC from indi-
vidual endowments. When |N | = |O| = 3, a deterministic allocation rule is Pareto
efficient, group strategy-proof, and balanced if and only if it is a TTC from individual
endowments or a TC rule with three brokers.
39
Papai (2000) characterized the hierarchical exchange rules by Pareto efficiency,
group strategy-proofness, and reallocation-proofness. Since a TTC from individual
endowments belongs to set of the hierarchical exchange rules, to prove theorem 3.1,
we just show that among all hierarchical exchange rules, only the rules of TTC from
individual endowments are balanced. Similarly, to prove theorem 3.2, we use Pycia
and U¨nver’s (2016a) characterization of trading cycles rules by Pareto efficiency and
group strategy-proofness. Trading cycles rules are generalized from Papai’s hierarchi-
cal exchange rules. In the following subsections, we introduce hierarchical exchange
rules first, then introduce trading cycles rules. And finally, we prove theorem 3.2.
The proof of theorem 3.1 is similar to part of the proof of theorem 3.2. We also
introduce theorem 3.1* and theorem 3.2* in this section.
3.2.1 Hierarchical exchange rules
Pa´pai (2000) generalized Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) model to the case where
some agents may initially owns more than one object and each object is initial owned
by some agent, but still kept the assumption of unit demand. She defined the hi-
erarchical exchange (HE) rules and characterized them by Pareto efficiency, group
strategy-proofness, and reallocation-proofness.
Like in Shapley and Scarf’s model, the TTC algorithm finds the allocation for
a HE rule. As each agent demands one object but some agent may initially owns
more than one object, a HE rule has to specify how the objects are inherited. During
the TTC procedure, who inherites what depends only on the assignments that have
formed in previous cycles. More specifically, the inheritance rule of a HE rule is
defined by an inheritance forest. In the inheritance forest, there is an inheritance
tree for each object. Each tree defines who initially owns and who potentially inherits
the object under different allocation scenarios. An inheritance tree consists of a set
40
of vertices and a set of arcs. Each vertex is connected to other vertex(es) via arc(s).
Each arc connects two distinct vertices. In each tree, there is a unique vertex such
that there is no arc from other vertices to the vertex. We call this vertex level 1
vertex. In our model with n agents and n objects, there are n− 1 arcs pointing from
the level 1 vertex to n − 1 vertices which we call level 2 vertices. For each level 2
vertex, there n − 2 arcs pointing from the level 2 vertex to n − 2 vertices which we
call level 3 vertices. In general, for each level k vertex (1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1), there are
n− k arcs pointing from the level k vertex to n− k level k + 1 vertices. There is no
arc pointing from a level n vertex.
Each vertex is labeled by an agent and each arc is labeled by an object. The
labeling of each inheritance tree (say the tree for object o) should satisfy the following
conditions to make it well-defined:
• A level 1 vertex can be labeled by any agent (say i). The labeled agent initially
owns the object.
• Each arc from vertex i should be labeled by distinct objects other than o; so
there are n− 1 arcs pointing to n− 1 level 2 vertices.
• There is a unique path from a level 1 vertex to a level n vertex. Each vertex
on a path should be labeled by a distinct agent, and each arc on a path should
be labeled by a distinct object.
If a path of the tree for an object (say o1) is i1
o2→ i2 o3→ i3 o4→ · · · on→ in, then i1
initially owns o1; if i1 is assigned o2, then i2 inherits o1; if i1 is assigned o2, and i2 is
assigned o3, then i3 inherits o1, etc.
Example 3.2: Consider a HE rule with three agents 1, 2, 3, and three objects
a, b, c shown in figure 3.1.
41
Γa
1
3 2
2 3
b c
c b
Γb
1
2 2
3 3
a c
c a
Γc
2
3 3
1 1
a b
b a
Figure 3.1: A hierarchical exchange rule
The inheritance forest in figure 3.1 implies that agent 1 initially owns objects a
and b, agent 2 initially owns c, and agent 3 initially owns nothing. For tree Γa, the
path 1
b→ 3 c→ 2 means if 1 is assigned b, then 3 inherits a; if 1 is assigned b, and 3 is
assigned c, then 2 inherits a. Similarly, for tree Γa, the path 1
c→ 2 b→ 3 means if 1 is
assigned c, then 2 inherits a; if 1 is assigned c, and 2 is assigned b, then 3 inherits a.
Given a HE rule, the TTC algorithm is applied to find the allocation:
• At the beginning of step 1: each object is owned by an agent. Some agent
may initially owns more than one object and some agent may initially owns
nothing.
• At step 1: each agent who owns some object(s) points to the agent who owns
her best choice. Like the TTC from individual endowments, at least one cycle
exists. Remove all cycles from the market and assign each agent in a cycle
her best choice. The remaining agents keep their initial endowments, and they
inherit the objects left by the assigned agents according to the inheritance
forest.
• In general, at the beginning of step k: each remaining object is owned by some
agent. Each remaining agent who owns some object(s) points to the agent who
owns her favorite object among the remaining ones. Again, at least one cycle
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exists. Remove all cycles from the market and assign each agent in a cycle
her best choice among the remaining objects. Each remaining agent keeps her
endowment that she owns at the beginning of step k. Remaining agents also
inherit the object(s) left by the assigned agent(s) at step k according to the
inheritance forest.
• The algorithm stops when all agents are removed from the market.
A important feature of the HE rules is persistence property, i.e., once an agent
owns an object (initially endowed or inherited), she retains it until she is assigned.
The following example 3.3 illustrates how a HE rule works.
Example 3.3: Suppose the HE rule is determined by the inheritance forest in
example 3.2, and the preference profile is given in table 3.1.
R1 R2 R3
b a b
a c c
c b a
Table 3.1: The preferences for a HE rule
Table 3.1 shows agents’ preferences over objects (from top to bottom). At step
1, since agent 1 initially owns a and b and her top choice is b, so agent 1 points
to herself; agent 2 initially owns c and her top choice is a, so she points to agent
1. There is only one cycle at this step: agent 1 points to herself. So agent 1 is
allocated with object b and we remove agent 1 along with her assignment from the
market. At the beginning of step 2, agent 2 still owns object c. Object a is left by
agent 1. The inheritance tree of object a indicates that given agent 1 receives b, the
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one who inherits a is agent 3. So at the beginning of step 2, agent 2 owns object
c and agent 3 owns object a. In the reduced market, agent 2’s best choice among
the remaining ones is c, and agent 3’s best choice among the remaining ones is a.
So agent 2 and agent 3 point to each other and swap their endowments. Figure 3.2
shows the procedure.
1
a b
2 c
Step 1:
1
a 3 b
2 c
Step 2:
Figure 3.2: The procedure of a HE rule
If each tree in the inheritance forest has a distinct level 1 vertex labeling, then
the HE rule is a TTC from individual endowments. Other special cases of HE rules
include serial dictatorships and fixed endowment HE rules described below.
3.2.1.1 Serial dictatorships
In a HE rule, if the same level vertices are labeled by the same agent and different
levels vertices are labeled by distinct agents for all trees, we call such rule a serial
dictatorship (Svensson 1999). In a serial dictatorship, the level 1 agent initially
owns all objects, the level 2 agent inherits all objects when the level 1 agent chooses,
the level 3 agent inherits all objects when the level 2 agent chooses, and so forth.
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An agent labeled at a lower level vertex has a higher priority for all objects than
an agent labeled at a higher level vertex. Figure 3.3 shows an example of a serial
dictatorship in which agent 1 has the highest priority, agent 2 has the second highest
priority, and agent 3 has the lowest priority.
Γa
1
2 2
3 3
b c
c b
Γb
1
2 2
3 3
a c
c a
Γc
1
2 2
3 3
a b
b a
Figure 3.3: A serial dictatorship
The random serial dictatorship (or single lottery mechanism) proposed
by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998) is a random mechanism aims at ex ante fair-
ness. The agent are ordered randomly with any one of the n! orderings being equally
likely. For any given priority ordering, the corresponding serial dictatorship finds the
allocation. They also define the TTC from random endowments as a random
mechanism such that each agent random endows with one object with n! possibilities
being equally likely. For a given realization of endowments, the TTC from individ-
ual endowments is used to find the allocation. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998)
showed that the random serial dictatorship is equivalent to the TTC from random
endowments as the distributions of assignments are the same for both mechanisms.
3.2.1.2 Fixed endowment HE rules
The inheritance forest of a fixed endowment HE rule can be represented by
the trees such that different trees may be labeled differently, but the same level
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vertices in each tree are labeled with the same agent. The following figure 3.4 shows
a fixed endowment HE rule.
Γa
2
3 3
1 1
b c
c b
Γb
1
2 2
3 3
a c
c a
Γc
1
3 3
2 2
a b
b a
Figure 3.4: A fixed endowment HE rule
The fixed endowment HE rules can be used to define multiple lottery mechanism
(Pathak and Sethuraman 2011). In a multiple lottery mechanism, each object
randomly uses an ordering of agents among n! possibilities, therefore, (n!)n possible
fixed endowment inheritance forests are equally likely to be selected. Given a fixed
endowment HE rule, the corresponding allocation is selected as the outcome.
A serial dictatorship is a special case of a fixed endowment HE rule in which
the labelings of all trees in the inheritance forest are the same. We can also write
a TTC from individual endowments as a fixed endowment HE rule since the level k
vertices for k ≥ 2 will never be reached. Pathak and Sethuraman (2011) generalized
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez’s (1998) result by showing that the single lottery mech-
anism (random serial dictatorship) is equivalent to the multiple lottery mechanism
as their ex ante distributions over assignments are the same. Given a HE rule, if
we view the labeling of vertices as “roles” in the mechanism, then we can define the
corresponding random HE rule by assigning agents to the “roles” via a unifor-
m lottery over n! possibilities. Lee and Sethuraman (2011) showed that the single
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lottery mechanism is equivalent to any random HE rule.
3.2.2 Trading cycles rules
Pycia and U¨nver (2016a) constructed trading cycles (TC) rules. The TC rules
subsume the HE rules as special cases and they are characterized by Pareto efficiency
and group strategy-proofness. The major difference between the HE rules and the
TC rules is that one agent in a TC rule may not own but, instead, brokers an object,
or all the three remaining objects could be brokered by three agents. During the
procedure of a TC rule, the broker may not be allowed to point to herself. A TC
rule consists of a serial of steps described below.
• In general, at the beginning of step k: each object is either owned or brokered by
an agent. There is at most one brokered object, or all three remaining objects
are brokered. If an agent brokers an object, then the agent owns nothing.
• At step k, there are two cases.
– Case 1: there is at most one broker.
Each owner points to the agent who owns or brokers her best choice. If
there exists a broker, then she points to her favorite object owned by other
agents. Similar to the TTC from individual endowments, at least one cycle
exists. Assign each owner in a cycle her best choice. If a broker is part
of a cycle, then the broker is assigned her favorite object owned by other
agents. All assigned agents and objects are removed from the market.
Each remaining owner keeps her initial endowment, and she may inherit
the objects left by the assigned agents according to the inheritance rule.
If the broker is still in the market and there exists at least one remaining
owner, then the broker retains her brokerage right. If the broker is the only
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remaining agent, then the brokered object is assigned to her. If there are
three remaining agents and none of them owns an object at the beginning
of step k, then each one of the three agents or at most one agent brokers
an object at the beginning of step k + 1.
– Case 2: there are three brokers and each brokers one object.
Each broker points to the agent who brokers her best choice. If these
three agents forms a cycle, then assign each broker her best choice. If the
cycle of three brokers does not exist, then there exists a cycle such that
broker i points to a brokered object and there is another broker points
to this brokered object. Then we force broker i points to the agent who
brokers her next choice. If now three brokers form a cycle, then assign each
broker the object brokered by the agent that she points to. Otherwise,
there exists a non-three-agent cycle such that broker j points to a brokered
object and there is another broker points to this brokered object. Then
we force broker j points to the agent who brokers her next choice. If now
three brokers form a cycle, then assign each broker the object brokered
by the agent that she points to. Otherwise, iterate the process until three
brokers form a cycle.
• The algorithm stops when all agents are assigned.
Note that in a model with at least four agents, there exists at most one broker at
the beginning of step 1. As the procedure goes on, we may have three brokers and
each of them brokers one object. If there are no brokers throughout the procedure,
then the TC rule is a HE rule. Similar to the HE rules, TC rules also satisfy
persistence property, i.e., once an owner owns an object, she retains it until she
receives her assignment, and a broker also keeps her brokerage right until she is
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assigned. In our model that the number of agents is equal to the number of objects,
a broker never has a chance to inherit objects. The following example 3.4 illustrates
how a TC rule works.
Example 3.4: Suppose agent 1 initially brokers object a, and agent 2 and 3
initially own objects b and c, respectively. Preference profile is given in table 3.2.
Then at step 1, agents 1 points to agent 2, agents 2 and 3 both point to agent 1. So
agents 1 and 2 are assigned objects b and a, respectively. At step 2, agent 3 points
to herself and is assigned object c.
R1 R2 R3
a a a
b b b
c c c
Table 3.2: The preferences for a TC rule
Fix a TC rule and define the corresponding random TC rule by assigning agents
to the “roles” in the TC rule via a uniform lottery. Bade (2014) showed that given
a preference profile, the distribution over outcomes that arises from a random TC
rule is the same as the distribution over outcomes that arises from the random serial
dictatorship.
The random serial dictatorship is considered to be ex ante fair as all agents
have the same chances on the priority list before knowing the realization of the
lottery. Therefore, all the random TC rules are equally ex ante fair because their
distributions over outcomes are the same. But after knowing its realization, a single
lottery ordering seems to be unfair since the agent at the top of the priority list
always receives her best choice, while the agent at the end of the list receives her best
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choice only if her best choice is not the best choice of any other agent. Preferences
are private information. Before knowing the preferences, and suppose all possible
preference profiles are equally likely to occur, if a deterministic mechanism assigns
all agents to their kth best choices with equal probabilities for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n, we
say the mechanism is interim fair. We show that among all TC rules, an allocation
rule that satisfies our new property balancedness if and only if it is a TTC from
individual endowments if there are at least three agents or just two agents. Our
theorem 3.2 characterizes the TTC from individual endowments by Pareto efficiency,
group strategy-proofness, and balancedness when the number of agents is not three.
The fact that a TTC from individual endowments is balanced follows from sym-
metry. To prove it, we construct a bijection τ from PN to PN such that for any
preference profile R ∈ PN , if agent i receives the kth best choice in Ri and agent j
receives the lth best choice in Rj, then for the preference profile R
′ = τ(R), agent i
receives the lth best choice in R′i and agent j receives the kth best choice in R
′
j. We
use the following example 3.5 to illustrate the idea.
Example 3.5: In a three agents and three goods economy, the initial endowment
is given by ω = (o1, o2, o3). Under the original preference profile R given in table
3.3, the assignment is shown in boldface where agents 1, 2, and 3 receive their best,
second best, and best choices, respectively. We want to construct a new preference
profile R′ = τ(R) under which agent 2 and 3 receive their best and second best
choices, respectively, while agent 1 still receives her best choice. To this end, we first
switch the preferences of R2 and R3 to get R¯ = (R1, R3, R2). Then for each R¯1, R¯2,
and R¯3, we swap the position of o2 and o3 to get R
′ shown in table 3.4. Note that
agent 1 is assigned the same ranked object under R′ as under R, while the rankings
of agents 2 and 3’s assignments under R′ are switched when compared with their
assignments under R.
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R1 R2 R3
o2 o3 o3
o1 o1 o2
o3 o2 o1
Table 3.3: Original preference profile R
R′1 R
′
2 R
′
3
o3 o2 o2
o1 o3 o1
o2 o1 o3
Table 3.4: Transformed preference profile R′
To prove the only if part of theorem 3.2, we need the following proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1: Let f and f ′ be two different TC rules. Define #′(k, i) as the
number of preference profiles that agent i receive her kth best choice under f ′, i.e.,
#′(k, i) ≡ ∣∣{R ∈ PN : f ′i(R) is the kth best in Ri}∣∣. Then
∑
i∈N
#(k, i) =
∑
i∈N
#′(k, i), ∀k = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Proposition 3.1 follows from symmetry and the result of Bade (2014), i.e., random
TC rules are equivalent since their distributions over outcomes are the same. We use
the following example 3.6 to verify proposition 3.1, and then provide a proof.
Example 3.6: Consider a three agents and three objects economy. Let f be
a TC rule such that agent 1 brokers a, agents 2 and 3 own b and c, respectively.
Let f ′ be a TTC from individual endowments such that agent 1, 2, and 3 own
objects a, b and c, respectively. Rows 2 to 4, and rows 7 to 9 in table 3.5 show
the numbers of preference profiles that agent i receives her kth best choice under
rules f and f ′, respectively. We can verify that
∑3
i=1 #(1, i) =
∑3
i=1 #
′(1, i) = 432,
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∑3
i=1 #(2, i) =
∑3
i=1 #
′(2, i) = 144, and
∑3
i=1 #(3, i) =
∑3
i=1 #
′(3, i) = 72.
f #(1, i) #(2, i) #(3, i)
i = 1 96 72 48
i = 2 168 36 12
i = 3 168 36 12∑3
i=1 #(k, i) 432 144 72
f ′ #′(1, i) #′(2, i) #′(3, i)
i = 1 144 48 24
i = 2 144 48 24
i = 3 144 48 24∑3
i=1 #
′(k, i) 432 144 72
Table 3.5: Example 3.6 for proposition 3.1
Proof of proposition 1. Given a deterministic TC rule f , interpret agents
in the rule as “roles” in the rule. By assigning agents to the “roles” via a uniform
lottery, we construct a corresponding random allocation rule. A random allocation
rule consists of n! deterministic rules. All of them are equally likely to be selected.
Denote these deterministic rules as f(t) for all t = 1, 2, · · · , n!. And define
#t(k, i) ≡
∣∣{R ∈ PN : f(t)i(R) is the kth best in Ri}∣∣ ,
where f(t)i(R) is the assignment agent i receives under the rule f(t) when preference
profile is R. Similarly, for another deterministic TC rule f ′, we can construct n!
deterministic rules by assigning agents to “roles” via a uniform lottery. Denote these
rules as f ′(t) for all t = 1, 2, · · · , n!. Define
#′t(k, i) ≡
∣∣{R ∈ PN : f ′(t)i(R) is the kth best in Ri}∣∣ .
52
Bade (2014) showed that given a preference profile, for any two random TC rules,
their distributions over outcomes are the same. When we consider all possible pref-
erence profiles, for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n, we have the following result
n!∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
#t(k, i) =
n!∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
#′t(k, i). (1)
It is clear that given a deterministic allocation rule, the assignment depends only on
the preferences of “roles”. Therefore, for any two t, t′, and for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n,
we have
n∑
i=1
#t(k, i) =
n∑
i=1
#t′(k, i), (2)
and
n∑
i=1
#′t(k, i) =
n∑
i=1
#′t′(k, i). (3)
Equations (1) to (3) imply proposition 3.1. 
Armed with proposition 3.1, we can prove theorem 3.2.
Proof of theorem 3.2. “⇐” Pycia and U¨nver’s (2016a, 2016b) results imply
that a TTC from individual endowments and a TC rule with three brokers are
both Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof. Let f be a TTC from individual
endowments. Denote ωi as the initial endowment of agent i. For any R ∈ PN ,
suppose fi(R) is the kth in Ri, fj(R) is the lth in Rj. Construct a mapping τ :
PN → PN such that for any R ∈ PN , and any k /∈ {i, j}, switch the positions of
ωi and ωj in Rk to form τ(Rk), while τ(Ri) is formed by switching the positions of
ωi and ωj of Rj, and τ(Rj) is formed by switching the positions of ωi and ωj of Ri.
Then fi(τ(R)) is the lth in τ(Ri), and fj(τ(R)) is the kth in τ(Rj). This is true
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because during the TTC procedure, any agent points to agent i (or j) under R would
point to agent j (or i) under R′, while the agent who points to m /∈ {i, j} under
R still points to m under R′. So under the transformed preference profile, agent i
plays the “role” as if she was agent j, and agent j plays the “role” as if she was
agent i. Hence for the new preference profile R′, agent m /∈ {i, j} still receives the
same ranked choice under R′ as under R, even though what she receives may not
be the same as the one under R, while agent i receives the lth choice in τ(Ri), and
agent j receives the kth choice in τ(Rj). Also note that τ is a bijection. Therefore,
a TTC from individual endowments is balanced. Similarly, we can prove that a TC
rule with three brokers is also balanced.
“⇒” When |N | = |O| 6= 3, based on Pycia and U¨nver’s (2016a, 2016b) result, to
prove the only if part, we only have to show that among all TC rules, a balanced
rule is a TTC from individual endowments. Suppose not. Two cases are considered.
Case 1: suppose there exists an agent, say i, who initially owns more than one
object. Then by persistence, for any preference profile, agent i will not be assigned
her worst choice. But if all agents have the same preferences, then Pareto efficiency
implies someone would receive the worst choice, a violation to the last condition of
balancedness. Case 2: Suppose no agent initially owns more than one object and
the rule is not a TTC from individual endowments, then there exists a broker, say
agent i, who brokers one object (say o) while other agents each initially owns one
object (we use TC to denote this rule). Now, consider a corresponding TTC from
individual endowments where agent i initially not brokers but owns object o (we
use TTC to denote this rule), while other agents in the TTC own what they own
in the TC. For any preference profile R, two subcases are considered. Subcase 2.1:
if TTC assigns agent i an object other than o, then the outcomes of TC and TTC
are the same. Subcase 2.2: if TTC assigns agent i object o, then agent i will be
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assigned o or an object that is ranked below o since she cannot point to herself
unless she is the unique agent in the market. For example, if o is the best choice
under Ri, then TTC will assign i object o. But if o is also the best choice of all other
agents, then TC will assign i her second best choice. Therefore, subcases 2.1 and 2.2
imply that the number preference profiles that agent i receives her best choice under
TC is smaller than the number of preference profiles that agent i receives her best
choice under TTC. But proposition 2.1 shows that the summation of the numbers
of preference profiles that all agents receive their best choices under TTC is equal
to the summation of the numbers of preference profiles that all agents receive their
best choices under TC. Therefore, the TC rule with one broker is not balanced.
When |N | = |O| = 3, a TC rule with a owner who initially owns two or three
objects, or a TC rule with two owners and one broker are not balanced; therefore, an
Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof, and balanced allocation rule could be a TTC
from individual endowments, or a TC rule with three brokers. 
Three conditions required in Theorem 3.2 are independent. If one of them is
violated, we can find an allocation rule that satisfies the others. A serial dictatorship
is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof, but no balanced. A fixed allocation
rule where agent i always receives oi is balanced and group strategy-proof, but not
Pareto efficient. The rule in example 3.7 is Pareto efficient and balanced, but not
group strategy-proof.
Example 3.7: Let N = {1, 2, 3}, O = {a, b, c}, initial endowment ω = (a, b, c),
two preference profiles R̂ and R˜, and the rule ψ are given by
ψ(R) =

(b, c, a), if R = R̂;
(c, a, b), if R = R˜;
TTC(R), otherwise.
55
R̂1 R̂2 R̂3
b a a
c c c
a b b
R˜1 R˜2 R˜3
c a a
b b b
a c c
The rule ψ is Pareto efficient and balanced, but it is not group strategy-proof as
under R̂, if agent 2 reports R2 = aP2bP2c, then ψ2(R̂−2, R2)P̂2ψ2(R̂).
We use the following example 3.8 to verify theorem 3.2.
Example 3.8: Consider an economy with two agents and two objects. Let
N = {i, j}, O = {a, b}. There are two kinds of preferences and hence four possible
preference profiles shown in columns 2 to 5 of table 3.6. And there are eight TC rules
including four HE rules. The first column shows these TC rules, where ωi denotes
the initial endowment for agent i, and βi denotes agent i initially brokers an object.
Since there are only two agents, we do not have specify an inheritance structure
to define a TC rule. The assignments are shown in boldface. We can see that two
TTC rules from individual endowments satisfy balancedness, while the other six rules
violate balancedness.
Note that the proof of the only if part in theorem 3.2 implies that if f belongs to
the set of the HE rules, then f is a TTC from individual endowment if and only if all
agent have equal chances to their worst choice, i.e., for all i, j ∈ N , #(n, i) = #(n, j).
Based on this observation, we have the following theorem 3.1* and theorem 3.2*.
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Ri Rj Ri Rj Ri Rj Ri Rj #(k, i) #(k, j)
ωi = {a, b} a a a b b a b b #(1, i) = 4 #(1, j) = 2
ωj = ∅ b b b a a b a a #(2, i) = 0 #(2, j) = 2
ωi = {a} a a a b b a b b #(1, i) = 3 #(1, j) = 3
ωj = {b} b b b a a b a a #(2, i) = 1 #(2, j) = 1
ωi = ∅ a a a b b a b b #(1, i) = 2 #(1, j) = 4
ωj = {a, b} b b b a a b a a #(2, i) = 2 #(2, j) = 0
ωi = {b} a a a b b a b b #(1, i) = 3 #(1, j) = 3
ωj = {a} b b b a a b a a #(2, i) = 1 #(2, j) = 1
βi = {a} a a a b b a b b #(1, i) = 2 #(1, j) = 4
ωj = {b} b b b a a b a a #(2, i) = 2 #(2, j) = 0
βi = {b} a a a b b a b b #(1, i) = 2 #(1, j) = 4
ωj = {a} b b b a a b a a #(2, i) = 2 #(2, j) = 0
ωi = {a} a a a b b a b b #(1, i) = 4 #(1, j) = 2
βj = {b} b b b a a b a a #(2, i) = 0 #(2, j) = 2
ωi = {b} a a a b b a b b #(1, i) = 4 #(1, j) = 2
βj = {a} b b b a a b a a #(2, i) = 0 #(2, j) = 2
Table 3.6: Example 3.8 for theorem 3.2
Theorem 3.1*: An allocation rule f is Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof,
reallocation-proof and satisfying #(n, i) = #(n, j) for all i, j ∈ N if and only if it is
a TTC from individual endowments.
Theorem 3.2*: When |N | = |O| 6= 3, an allocation rule f is Pareto efficient,
group strategy-proof, and satisfies #(n, i) = #(n, j) for all i, j ∈ N if and only if
it is a TTC from individual endowments. When |N | = |O| = 3, an allocation rule
f is Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof, and satisfies #(n, i) = #(n, j) for all i,
j ∈ N if and only if it is a TTC from individual endowments or a TC rule with three
brokers.
Proof of theorem 3.2*. We only have the show the only if part. An allocation
rule in which some agent initially owns at least two objects violates the condition
that #(n, i) = #(n, j). Let us pick an agent i in a TTC from individual endowments.
57
Now change the allocation rule to a TC rule such that i is a broker. Then for any
preference profile, i cannot better off. When all agent have the same preferences and
rank the brokered object as their (n − 1)th best choice, then i is strictly worse off
under TC by receiving her worst choice. Again, by proposition 3.1, #(n, i) = #(n, j)
for all i, j ∈ N is violated. 
The only if part of theorem 3.1* (or theorem 3.2*) is less restrictive than that
of theorem 3.1 (or theorem 3.2). It says that whenever the number of agents is
not three, even if we only care the chances that agents would be assigned to their
worst choice, only the TTC from individual endowments are desirable among all
rules satisfying the efficiency and the incentive properties.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter is motivated by policymakers and parents’ intuition quoted in Pathak
and Sethuraman (2011) that the single lottery mechanism seems less equitable than
the multiple lottery mechanism in school choice problem. An extreme case of the
realization of the multiple lottery is that each agent is initially endowed with one
object. But previous results by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998), Pathak and
Sethuraman (2011), Lee and Sethuraman (2011), and Bade (2014) showed that giv-
en any two Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof deterministic allocation rules,
the corresponding random allocation rules, including single lottery mechanism and
multiple lottery mechanism, are equivalent. We formally define an interim fairness
property that we call “balancedness.” It is an interim fairness property in the sense
that before knowing agents’ true preferences, if all possible preference profiles are
equally likely to happen, then a deterministic allocation rule is balanced if all agents
have equal chances to their best choices, have equal chances to their second best
choices, and so forth. Our main result shows that in models with at least four agents
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or just two agents, among all Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof rules, only the
top trading cycles from individual endowments satisfy balancedness; and when there
are only three agents, an allocation rule satisfies Pareto efficiency, group strategy-
proofness and balancedness if and only if it is a TTC from individual endowments
or a TC rule with three brokers.
In practice, the single lottery mechanism and the multiple lottery mechanism are
used in assigning students to public schools. The policy implication of our result is
if policymakers can freely choose any allocation rule, for the sake of fairness, then
they should randomly assign each agent an object and then use the TTC algorithm
to find the assignment.
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4. HOUSE ALLOCATION WITH WEAK PREFERENCES
This chapter studies problems of allocating indivisible resources to people. For
example, offices have to be assigned to new faculty, public school seats have to be
assigned to students, and organs for transplant have to be assigned to patients. Such
problems are referred to as one-sided matching problems as opposed to two-sided
matching problems in the sense that in the two disjointed sets of agents (offices
and faculty members, school seats and students, and organs and patients), only the
agents of one side have preferences over the agents of the other side. An important
constraint in real-world indivisible goods allocation problems is the lack of monetary
transfers: faculty offices, public school seats and organs for transplant cannot be
traded for money. This constraint implies that classical competitive market cannot
be applied to find efficient outcomes.
The pioneering work on one-sided matching problems was initiated by Shapley
and Scarf (1974). They presented a housing market model. In this model, each
agent is endowed with one indivisible good and wants to trade it for a better one
that might be endowed by another agent in the market. They were interested in
whether the core allocation defined by weak dominance exists. They showed that
a top trading cycles algorithm invented by David Gale finds an allocation in the
core. Roth and Postlewaite (1977) proved that the top trading cycles algorithm
finds the unique matching in the core of each problem when preferences are strict.
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) presented a house allocation model in which no agent
initially owns any house. Svensson (1999) showed that for a house allocation problem
with strict preferences, an allocation rule is strategy-proof, non-bossy, and neutral if
and only if it is serially dictatorial. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998) studied the
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relationship between the serial dictatorships and the core from assigned endowments,
and they also showed that the random serial dictatorship is equivalent to the core
from random endowments when indifference is excluded.
A large literature on matching theory assumes that preferences are strict. With-
out strict preferences, many good properties fail to hold. For example, Shapley and
Scarf (1974) provided an example showing that the core may disappear when indiffer-
ences are allowed. Alternatively, Pa´pai (2000) showed that group strategy-proofness
is equivalent to strategy-proofness and non-bossiness; but this equivalence breaks
down on the weak domain (Ehlers 2002). Due to the undesirable properties and
the complexity induced by ties, weak preferences are ignored in most of the existing
matching literature. But indifferences are prevailing in the real world. For example,
in the kidney exchange problem (Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver 2004), each patient-donor
pair wants to exchange for a compatible kidney from another patient-donor pair. If
their preferences are based on checklist criteria such as blood and tissue types, then
different kidney with the same criteria should be regarded as indifferent. Another
example is school choice problem (Erdil and Ergin 2008) which consists of a set of
students and a set of public schools with limited numbers of seats. Each school has
a priority ranking over students. The ranking is determined by local laws and edu-
cational policies. Such priorities are weak orderings and the indifference classes are
quite large.
Recently, Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012)
defined two kinds of allocation rules that are Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and
individual rational for housing market problem when indifferences are allowed. Ehlers
(2014) provided a characterization of top trading cycles with fixed tie-breaker for
the housing market problem with indifferences by individual rationality, strategy-
proofness, weak efficiency, non-bossiness, and consistency.
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This chapter studies house allocation problem with weak preferences. By extend-
ing the results proved by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998), our corollary 4.1 and
corollary 4.2 show that the strong relationship between the serial dictatorships and
the top trading cycles, and the equivalence of random serial dictatorship and the
top trading cycles with random endowments still hold under weak preferences when
we use fixed tie-breaking or random tie-breaking. Our theorem 4.1 and theorem 4.2
show that the serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking satisfies weak Pareto effi-
ciency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency; moreover, it is not Pareto
dominated by any Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rule.
This chapter is organized as follows: section 4.1 formally presents the model,
section 4.2 introduces allocations rules, section 4.3 shows our main result, and section
4.4 concludes.
4.1 The model
Consider the following problem: a department hires n new faculty member-
s and wants to assign each one of them a distinct office. Each faculty member
has preferences over n available offices. A house allocation problem (Hylland
and Zeckhauser 1979) is a triple (A,H,R), where A = (1, 2, · · · , n) is the set of
agents, H = (h1, h2, · · · , hn) is the set of indivisible goods (hereafter houses), and
R = (R1, R2, · · · , Rn) is a preference profile consisting of a list of preference relations
over houses. Following the classical assumptions, we assume that the number of
agents equals the number of houses.
Let the set of all preference relations be R, and the set of all preference profiles
be RA. Given a preference profile R ∈ RA, agent a’s preference relation Ra might be
weak, and it is complete and transitive. Let R−a be the list of preference relations of
all agents but a. For all agents a ∈ A, let Pa and Ia denote the “better than” relation
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and “indifference” relation induced by the preference relation Ra. For all S ⊆ A, let
RS = (Ra)a∈S be the restriction of R to S and R−S = RA\S. For all M ⊆ H, let
Ra|M be the restriction of Ra to M and RS|M = (Ra|M)a∈S.
A binary relation >a is a strict order on a set H if it is irreflexive (h >a h
does not hold for any h ∈ H), asymmetric (if h >a h′, then h′ >a h does not hold),
and transitive (h >a h
′ and h′ >a h′′ implies h >a h′′). Let a list of strict orders
>= (>1, >2, · · · , >n) denote a profile of fixed tie-breakers and  be the set of all
possible profiles of fixed tie-breakers. Note that the number of all profiles of fixed
tie-breakers is |  | = (n!)n. The choice of the tie-breakers is arbitrary and it is
independent of the preference profile to break ties. The random tie-breakers is a
uniform distribution over the set of all profiles of fixed tie-breakers, i.e., each profile
of fixed tie-breakers is chosen with equal probability.
Given Ra, R
′
a ∈ R, we say R′a is a strict transformation of Ra if (i) R′a is
strict (i.e,. for all hi 6= hj, we cannot have both hiR′ahj and hjR′ahi) and (ii) for all
hi, hj ∈ H, hiPahj implies hiP ′ahj (where P ′a is the “better than” relation associated
with R′a). For each agent a ∈ A, let R>a be the strict transformation of Ra with a
profile of fixed tie-breakers > such that for all hi, hj ∈ H with hiIahj and hi >a hj,
we have hiP
>
a hj, where P
>
a is the “better than” relation associated with R
>
a . That is,
R>a is a strict transformation of Ra with a profile of tie-breakers > in the sense that
strict preferences are preserved but ties are broken according to tie-breakers >. If Ra
is a strict preference, then R>a = Ra. Let R
> = (R>a )a∈A be the strict transformation
of R with a profile of fixed tie-breakers >. Note that only >a matters to break ties
in Ra, so a better way to express R
>
a is R
>a
a . But we use the former for notational
simplicity.
Given a profile of fixed tie-breakers >, the choice function X>a (H
′) of an agent
a ∈ A from a set of houses H ′ ⊆ H is the best house under the transformed strict
63
preference R>a among H
′, i.e.,
X>a (H
′) = h′ ⇐⇒ h′ ∈ H ′ and h′P>a h for all h ∈ H ′ \ {h′}.
The outcome of a house allocation problem is an assignment of houses to agents
such that each house is assigned to a distinct agent. Formally, the outcome is a
matching µ : A → H which is an one-to-one and onto function from A to H. For
all a ∈ A, µ(a) is the assignment of agent a under matching µ. Let the set of all
matchings be M . Note that the number of all matchings is |M | = n!.
Now we consider a slightly different problem: each faculty member is allocated
with one office, and they are allowed to trade it for a better one that might be
allocated by another agent in the market. A housing market problem (Shapley and
Scarf 1974) is simply a house allocation problem with a matching which is referred
to as the initial endowment. Formally, a housing market problem is a four-tuple
(A,H,R, µ), where µ is an initial endowment matching.
A matching rule is a mapping from preference profiles to the set of matchings,
i.e., a matching rule selects a matching for each problem. We will introduce two
matching rules in the next section.
4.2 The matching rules
4.2.1 Serial dictatorships with fixed tie-breaking
We first introduce a matching rule for the house allocation problem. Let an
ordering f : {1, 2, · · · , n} → A be a bijective function. We can interpret an ordering
as a list of priorities. That is, agent f(1) has the highest priority, agent f(2) has the
second highest priority, and so forth. Let F be the set of all such orderings. Note
that the number of all possible orderings is |F | = n!.
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Given a preference profile R ∈ RA, for any ordering f ∈ F and any profile of
fixed tie-breakers >, defined a simple serial dictatorship induced by f with a
profile of fixed tie-breaker >, ϕ>f as
(ϕ>f )f(1) = X
>
f(1)(H),
(ϕ>f )f(i) = X
>
f(i)
(
H \
i−1⋃
j=1
{ϕ>f (f(j))}
)
for i ⊆ {2, 3, · · · , n}.
That is, agent f(1) chooses her top choice among all houses under her transformed
preference R>f(1), agent f(2) chooses her top choice among those remaining under her
transformed preference R>f(2), and so on. When preferences are strict, we can simply
write serial dictatorship as ϕf . Now we introduce a matching rule for the housing
market problem.
4.2.2 Top trading cycles with fixed tie-breaking
Given a preference profile R ∈ RA, for each profile of fixed tie-breakers > and
each endowment µ, let ϕ>µ denote the top trading cycles (TTC) algorithm with
the profile of fixed tie-breakers > from the endowment µ. The algorithm goes as
follows:
At step 1: each agent a ∈ A points to the agent who owns her favorite house under
the transformed preferences R>a (that is, X
>
a (H)). A set of agent {a1, a2, · · · , am} ⊆
A consists a cycle if agent a1 points to agent a2, agent a2 points to agent a3, ... ,
agent am points to agent a1. Since the number of agents is finite and each agent
points to one agent, there is at least one cycle. Note that an agent points to herself
also forms a cycle. In each cycle, each agent receives the house owned by the agent
she points to. All agents with their allocated houses in all cycles are removed from
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the housing market. At step 1, each agent leaves the market receives (possibly) one
of her favorite houses among all houses.
· · ·
At step t: each remaining agent a points to the agent who owns her favorite
house among those remaining houses under the transformed preferences R>a . Again,
at least one cycle exists. In each cycle, each agent receives the house owned by the
agent she points to and all agents with their houses in the cycles are removed from
the housing market. The algorithm stops when no agent is in the market.
Because the number of agents is finite and at lease one agent is removed from the
market at each step, the algorithm terminates in finite k>µ steps. We partition agents
according to the steps at which they leave the market. Let A(µ,>) = {A1(µ,>
), A2(µ,>), · · · , Ak>µ (µ,>)} be such partition and we call this the cycle structures
for µ and >.
For all t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k>u }, let H t(µ,>) = {h ∈ H : µ(a) = h for some a ∈ At(µ,>
)}. That is, H t(µ,>) is the set of houses that are initially owned by and allocated
to agents who leave the market at the tth step. Given a preference profile R ∈ RA,
we can write the outcome of the TTC algorithm with the profile of fixed tie-breakers
> under endowment µ, ϕ>µ as
∀a ∈ A1(µ,>), ϕ>µ (a) = X>a (H).
∀t ∈ {2, 3, · · · , k>µ }, ∀a ∈ At(µ,>), ϕ>µ (a) = X>a
(
H \
t−1⋃
s=1
Hs(µ,>)
)
.
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4.3 Main result
A matching ν Pareto dominates another matching µ if ν(a)Raµ(a) for all a ∈ A
and ν(a)Paµ(a) for some agent a ∈ A. A matching is Pareto efficient if it is
not Pareto dominated by any matching. Let E be the set of Pareto efficient
allocations. A matching ν strictly Pareto dominates another matching µ if
ν(a)Paµ(a) for all a ∈ A. A matching is weakly Pareto efficient if it is not strictly
Pareto dominated by any matching. LetW E be the set of weakly Pareto efficient
allocations.
When preferences are strict, Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998) established a
strong link between the serial dictatorship and top trading cycles algorithm. They
showed that for any ordering f and any matching µ, the serial dictatorship induced
by f and the outcome of the TTC algorithm from assigned endowments µ (which is
also the unique matching in the core when preferences are strict) both yield Pareto
efficient matchings; for any Pareto efficient matching η, there is a serial dictator-
ship and a outcome of top trading cycles from assigned endowments that yields it.
Formally, ϕM = ϕF = E , where ϕM = {η ∈ M : ϕµ = η for some µ ∈ M },
ϕF = {η ∈M : ϕf = η for some f ∈ F}.
But under weak preferences, Ehlers (2014) showed that the outcome of the TTC
algorithm with fixed tie-breaking is just weakly Pareto efficient. Similarly, a serial
dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking may fail to yield a efficient allocation when pref-
erences are weak. We can illustrate this in an example of two agents and two houses.
Preferences are given in the following table 4.1. When the priority ordering satisfies
agent 1 chooses first, and the tie-breaker satisfies h2 >1 h1, then the outcome of the
serial dictatorship with the fixed tie-breaker is (h2, h1) which is Pareto dominated
by (h1, h2).
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R1 R2
h1, h2 h2
h1
Table 4.1: Serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking is not Pareto efficient
We have the following corollary that extends Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998)’s
result when preferences are weak.
Corollary 4.1:
(1) The set of matchings induced by serial dictatorships with fixed tie-breaking coin-
cides with the set of matchings induced by the TTC algorithm with fixed tie-breaking;
(2) the induced matchings are weakly Pareto efficient;
(3) for any Pareto efficient matching, there exists a serial dictatorship with fixed tie-
breaking and a TTC from assigned endowment with fixed tie-breaking that yields it.
That is,
E ⊆ ϕM = ϕF ( W E ,
where ϕM = {η ∈M : ϕ>µ = η for some µ ∈M and some >∈}, and ϕF = {η ∈
M : ϕ>f = η for some f ∈ F and some >∈}.
Corollary 4.1 implies that the strong link between serial dictatorship and Gale’s
TTC algorithm still holds for the full preference domain. Contrary to the scenario
of strict preferences, the outcomes are not necessarily Pareto efficient; they are just
weakly Pareto efficient. But they are not weak enough in the sense that i) some
“extremely” weakly Pareto efficient allocations could not be yielded by any serial
dictatorship or any Gale’s TTC algorithm (see the following example 4.1); and ii)
all the Pareto efficient allocations can be yielded by any one of the two classes of
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rules. We can illustrate the theorem in the following example 4.1 with three agents
and three houses.
Example 4.1: Preferences are given in the following table 4.2.
R1 R2 R3
h2, h3 h1 h1
h1 h3 h2
h2 h3
Table 4.2: The preferences for example 4.1
There are six serial dictatorshipsF = {(1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3), (2, 3, 1), (3, 1, 2),
(3, 2, 1)} and six initial endowments M = {(h1, h2, h3), (h1, h3, h2), (h2, h1, h3),
(h2, h3, h1), (h3, h1, h2), (h3, h2, h1)}. And there are (3!)3 = 216 profiles of fixed
tie-breakers, but only two types of them matter in this problem. Let the type 1 tie-
breaker >¯ be such that h2>¯1h3, and the type 2 tie-breaker >ˆ be satisfying h2>ˆ1h3.
The following table 4.3 list the outcomes of serial dictatorships and Gale’s TTC
algorithm.
ϕ>f ↘ >= >¯ >= >ˆ ϕ>µ ↘ >= >¯ >= >ˆ
f1 = (1, 2, 3) (h2, h1, h3) (h3, h1, h2) µ
1 = (h1, h2, h3) (h2, h1, h3) (h3, h2, h1)
f2 = (1, 3, 2) (h2, h3, h1) (h3, h2, h1) µ
2 = (h1, h3, h2) (h2, h3, h1) (h3, h1, h2)
f3 = (2, 1, 3) (h2, h1, h3) (h3, h1, h2) µ
3 = (h2, h1, h3) (h2, h1, h3) (h3, h1, h2)
f4 = (2, 3, 1) (h3, h1, h2) (h3, h1, h2) µ
4 = (h2, h3, h1) (h2, h3, h1) (h2, h3, h1)
f5 = (3, 1, 2) (h2, h3, h1) (h3, h2, h1) µ
5 = (h3, h1, h2) (h3, h1, h2) (h3, h1, h2)
f6 = (3, 2, 1) (h2, h3, h1) (h2, h3, h1) µ
6 = (h3, h2, h1) (h2, h3, h1) (h3, h2, h1)
Table 4.3: The outcomes of example 4.1
From table 4.3 we can see that ϕF = {(h2, h1, h3), (h3, h1, h2), (h2, h3, h1), (h3, h2, h1)}
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= ϕM , and the set of Pareto efficient allocations is E = {(h2, h3, h1), (h3, h1, h2)}.
Also note that (h1, h3, h2) ∈ W E but (h1, h3, h2) /∈ ϕF = ϕM , which verifies
E ⊆ ϕM = ϕF ( W E .
Proof of corollary 4.1. The fact that ϕM = ϕ

F follows directly from
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998). We first show that E ⊆ ϕM . Let η ∈ E .
For any fixed tie-breaker >∈, we apply Gale’s TTC algorithm with the fixed tie-
breaker from the endowment η. At each step, no agent would point to a house that
is worse than her endowment, i.e., for all a ∈ A, ϕ>η (a)Raη(a). Since η is Pareto
efficient, we have ϕ>η (a)Iaη(a) for all a ∈ A. Now we pick up a tie-breaker >¯ such
that for each agent, her endowment is ordered first, i.e., for each a ∈ A, and each
h ∈ H \ η(a), η(a)>¯ah. With this tie-breaker >¯, whenever an agent is indifferent
between a house and her endowment and they are in the set of her most preferred
houses among the remaining houses, she would point to her endowment under Gale’s
TTC algorithm. This observation together with ϕ>η (a)Iaη(a) for all >∈ and all
a ∈ A imply ϕ>¯η (a) = η(a) for all a ∈ A which in turn implies η = ϕ>¯η ∈ ϕM ,
completing the proof of E ⊆ ϕM . Now we show that ϕF ( W E . Let η ∈ ϕF , then
there exist f ∈ F and >∈ such that η = ϕ>f . Agent f(1) chooses (one of) her
most preferred house(s) among all the houses. It is impossible to assign agent f(1)
a better house, showing that η ⊆ W E . The example 4.1 shows that ϕF 6= W E . 
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998) also showed that the random serial dicta-
torship is equivalent to the TTC from random endowments when preferences are
strict. We generalize this result in corollary 4.2 by allowing weak preferences. Before
presenting the result, we have to introduce more terminology. A lottery m is a
probability distribution over matchings, that is, m = (m1,m2, · · · ,mn!) such that∑n!
k=1mk = 1 and mk ≥ 0 for all k. Let mµ be the lottery that assigns probability 1
to matching µ. Let the set of all lotteries be ∆M . A lottery rule selects a lottery
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for each problem.
Given a preference profile R ∈ RA, define a random serial dictatorship with
a profile of fixed tie-breakers >, ψ>rsd as
ψ>rsd =
∑
f∈F
1
n!
mϕ
>
f ,
i.e., each serial dictatorship with the fixed tie breakers is chosen with equal proba-
bility.
Given a preference profile R ∈ RA, define a random serial dictatorship with
random tie-breakers, ψrsd as
ψrsd =
∑
>∈
∑
f∈F
1
(n!)n+1
mϕ
>
f ,
i.e., each serial dictatorship and each profile of fixed tie breakers are randomly se-
lected with uniform distribution and the induced serial doctorship is applied.
Given a preference profile R ∈ RA, define the outcome of the TTC algorithm
with a profile of fixed tie-breakers from random endowments, ψ>ttcre as
ψ>ttcre =
∑
µ∈M
1
n!
mϕ
>
µ ,
i.e., endowment is randomly selected with uniform distribution and each outcome of
the TTC algorithm with the fixed tie-breakers > is chosen with equal probability.
Given a preference profile R ∈ RA, define the outcome of the TTC algorithm
with random tie-breakers from random endowments, ψttcre as
ψttcre >=
∑
>∈
∑
µ∈M
1
(n!)n+1
mϕ
>
µ ,
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i.e., each endowment and each profile of fixed tie-breakers are randomly chosen with
uniform distribution and each outcome produced via the TTC algorithm is chosen
with equal probability.
The following corollary 4.2 follows directly from Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(1998).
Corollary 4.2:
(1) For any profile of fixed tie-breakers >, the random serial dictatorship with fixed
tie-breaking is equal to the TTC from random endowments with fixed tie-breaking,
i.e.,
ψ>rsd = ψ
>
ttcre.
(2) A random serial dictatorship with random tie-breakers is equivalent to the TTC
with random tie-breakers from random endowments, i.e.,
ψrsd = ψ

ttcre.
In the previous example 4.1,
ψ>¯rsd =
(
2
6
⊗ (h2, h1, h3), 3
6
⊗ (h2, h3, h1), 1
6
⊗ (h3, h1, h2)
)
= ψ>¯ttcre.
ψ>ˆrsd =
(
3
6
⊗ (h3, h1, h2), 2
6
⊗ (h3, h2, h1), 1
6
⊗ (h2, h3, h1)
)
= ψ>ˆttcre.
ψrsd =
(
2
12
⊗ (h2, h1, h3), 4
12
⊗ (h3, h1, h2), 4
12
⊗ (h2, h3, h1), 2
12
⊗ (h3, h2, h1)
)
= ψttcre.
Now we introduce some more definitions to present our theorem 4.1.
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A matching rule is Pareto efficient if it always selects a Pareto efficient matching
for each problem. A matching rule ϕ Pareto dominates another matching rule ϕ′
if for all (A,H,R), ϕa(R)Raϕ
′
a(R) for all a ∈ A, and ϕa¯(R)Pa¯ϕ′a¯(R) for some a¯ ∈ A
and some R, where ϕa(R) is agent a’s allocation under the rule ϕ with the preference
profile R.
A matching rule ϕ is strategy-proof if for all R ∈ RA, all a ∈ A, and all R′a ∈ R,
we have ϕa(R)Raϕa(R
′
a, R−a). Strategy-proofness requires that no agent can ben-
efit by unilaterally misreporting her preference relation. This incentive-compatible
condition ensures that truthfully reveal one’s preference is weakly dominant strategy.
A matching rule ϕ is non-bossy if for all R ∈ RA, all a ∈ A, and all R′a ∈ R,
if ϕa(R) = ϕa(R
′
a, R−a), then we have ϕ(R) = ϕ(R
′
a, R−a). Non-bossiness requires
that no agent can change the assignments of others by misreporting her preferences
without change the her allocation.
A matching rule ϕ is consistent if for all S ⊆ A and allR ∈ RA,⋃a∈A\S{ϕa(R)} =
H \M (with M ⊆ H) implies ϕa(RS|M) = ϕa(R) for all a ∈ S. Consistency requires
that whenever some set of agents receives their assigned houses, we can remove these
agents and their assignments from the economy without changing the allocation of
other agents.
Ehlers (2014) showed that in the housing market problem with indifference, Gale’s
TTC algorithm with fixed tie-breaking satisfying individual rationality, weak Pareto
efficiency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness and consistency. We obtain a similar
result in the house allocation problem with weak preferences.
Theorem 4.1: For any profile of fixed tie-breakers > and any priorities ordering
f , the serial dictatorship ϕ>f satisfies weak Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, non-
bossiness and consistency.
Proof of theorem 4.1. Weak Pareto efficiency was proved in corollary 4.1.
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Strategy-proofness: for all R ∈ RA, all a ∈ A, and all R′a ∈ R, since ϕf satisfies
strategy-proofness on the strict domain of preferences, so we have
(ϕ>f )a(R)R
>
a (ϕ
>
f )a(R
′
a, R−a),
where (ϕ>f )a(R) is the allocation for agent a under the matching ϕ
>
f (R). Since R
>
a
is the transformed preference that only break ties in Ra, so we have
(ϕ>f )a(R)Ra(ϕ
>
f )a(R
′
a, R−a),
i.e., strategy-proofness is satisfied.
Non-bossiness: for all R ∈ RA, all a ∈ A, and all R′a ∈ R, suppose we have
(ϕ>f )a(R) = (ϕ
>
f )a(R
′
a, R−a); we want to prove ϕ
>
f (R) = ϕ
>
f (R
′
a, R−a). Since ϕ
>
f (R) =
ϕf (R
>), so we have (ϕf )a(R
>) = (ϕf )a(R
′
a
>, R−a>). Since ϕf satisfies non-bossiness
on the strict domain, we have (ϕf )(R
>) = (ϕf )(R
′
a
>, R−a>). Again, by ϕ>f (R) =
ϕf (R
>), we have ϕ>f (R) = ϕ
>
f (R
′
a, R−a).
Consistency: for all S ⊆ A, all a ∈ S, and all R ∈ RA, suppose
⋃
a∈A\S
{(ϕ>f )a(R)} = H \M ;
we want to prove (ϕ>f )a(RS|M) = (ϕ>f )a(R). Since ϕ>f (R) = ϕf (R>), so we have⋃
a∈A\S{(ϕf )a(R>)} = H \ M . Since ϕf satisfies consistency on strict domain,
so we have (ϕf )a(R
>
S |M) = (ϕf )a(R>). Again, by ϕ>f (R) = ϕf (R>), we have
(ϕ>f )a(RS|M) = (ϕ>f )a(R), completing the proof of consistency. 
Even though fixed tie-breaking fails to achieve strict Pareto efficiency, it is com-
monly used in matching theory and market design. Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak and Roth
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(2009) and Kesten (2010) independently studied the school choice problem with indif-
ferences in priorities in which ties are broken according to fixed tie-breakers and then
apply student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to find the stable matching.
Kesten (2010) showed that no other strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules Pareto
dominates the DA algorithm with fixed tie-breaking. While Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak
and Roth (2009) defended this practice by showing that no other strategy-proof rules
Pareto dominates the DA algorithm with fixed tie-breaking. Ehlers (2014) presented
the housing market problem with indifferences and shows that the TTC algorithm
with fixed tie-breaking is not Pareto dominated by a rule satisfying strategy-proofness
and Pareto efficiency. We prove a similar result as showed in theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2: Serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking is not Pareto dominat-
ed by any strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rule.
Proof of theorem 4.2. Let A = {1, 2, 3, 4}, H = {h1, h2, h3, h4}. Let the pref-
erence relations be the same as the ones in Ehlers (2014), as shown in the following
table.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R
′
3
h2, h3 h1 h1 h3 h1
h1 h2 h2 h4 h2
h4 h3 h4 h2 h3
h4 h3 h1 h4
Let f = (1, 2, 3, 4) and > be such that h2 >
1 h3. Then ϕ
>
f (R) = (h2, h1, h4, h3).
Suppose ϕ dominates ϕ>f and ϕ is Pareto efficient, then we have ϕ(R) = (h2, h1, h4, h3)
= ϕ>f (R). We also have ϕ
>
f (R
′
3, R−3) = (h2, h1, h3, h4). Since ϕ is Pareto efficient and
it Pareto dominates ϕ>f , so ϕ(R
′
3, R−3) = (h3, h1, h2, h4) and thus ϕ(R
′
3, R−3)P3ϕ(R)
which means strategy-proofness is violated. 
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter studies house allocation problems when indifferences are allowed.
It shows that the serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking satisfies weak Pareto
efficiency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency, and further it is not
Pareto dominated by any Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rule. As corollaries
to Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998), it also shows that the relationship between
the serial dictatorships and the TTC algorithm from individual endowments, and
the equivalence of random serial dictatorship and the TTC algorithm with random
endowments still holds under weak preferences.
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5. CONCLUSION
This dissertation studies house allocation problems. The chapter 3 on balance
house allocation is motivated by Pathak and Sethuraman’s (2011) work. When
students are assigned to public schools in New York City, policymakers and parents
believe that a single lottery used for all schools is less equitable than lotteries at
each school. We formally define a fairness property that we call “balancedness.”
If all possible preference profiles are equally likely to happen, then a deterministic
allocation rule is balanced if all agents have equal chances to their best choices,
have equal chances to their second best choices, and so forth. When preferences
are strict, we show that in models with non-three agents, an allocation rule satisfies
Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and balancedness if and only if it is a top
trading cycles rule from individual endowments; and when there are three agents, an
allocation rule is Pareto efficient, group strategy-proof and balanced if and only if it
is a TTC from individual endowments or a TC rule with three brokers.
However, this balancedness property cannot hold for school choice problems when
capacities of each school is not one. In a school choice problem, agents has a strict
preference relation over schools, but they are indifferent between the seats of the
same school. The top trading cycles algorithm for school choice problem consists of
a serial of steps described as follows:
• At step 1: Each student points to her favorite school. Each school points to
the student with the highest priority. At least one cycle exists. Assign each
student the school she points to.
• In general, at step k: each remaining student points to her favorite school
with non-zero number of available seats. Each school with non-zero number
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of available seats points to the student with the highest priority among the
reaming students. Again, at least one cycle exists. Assign each student the
school she points to.
• The algorithm stops when no school or no student points.
Example. Consider a school choice problem with two schools, S1 and S2, and
four students, i, j, k and l. Each school has two seats. Table 5.1 shows the priority
ranking of each school.
S1 S2
i k
j l
Table 5.1: Two schools with same capacities
The numbers of preference profiles that each student receives her first and her
second best choices are given by:
#(1st, i) = 14, #(2nd, i) = 2. #(1st, k) = 14, #(2nd, k) = 2.
#(1st, j) = 12, #(2nd, j) = 4. #(1st, l) = 12, #(2nd, l) = 4.
We can see that the student at the top of the priority list has a higher chance to
her best choice than the student at the bottom of the priority list can.
Example. Consider another example with asymmetric capacities described in
table 5.2. School 1 has two seats, but school 2 has one seat.
The numbers of preference profiles that each student receives her first and second
best choices are given by:
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S1 S2
i k
j
Table 5.2: Two schools with asymmetric capacities
#(1st, i) = 6, #(2nd, i) = 2. #(1st, k) = 7, #(2nd, k) = 1.
#(1st, j) = 5, #(2nd, j) = 3. #(1st, l) = 12, #(2nd, l) = 4.
Again, for students who are each initially endowed with one seat at the same
school, the student with a higher ranking on the priority list has a higher chance
to her best choice than the student at a lower ranking on the priority list. But for
students at the same ranking position at distinct schools with different capacities,
the student who owns a seat in a school with a smaller capacity is favored.
In geneal, we can partition schools into groups such that schools in the same
group have the same capacity, as shown in table 5.3. Let ikt (j) be the student on jth
position at school Skt , where school S
k
t is a school from group G
k with k seats.
G1 G2 · · · Gq
S11 · · · S1t1 S21 · · · S2t2 · · · Sq1 · · · Sqtq
u · · · u u · · · u · · · u · · · u
u · · · u · · · u · · · u
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
u · · · u
Table 5.3: Schools with different capacities
We conjecture that the top trading cycles from individual endowments for school
choice problems satisfies:
1. #(nth, ikt (j)) = #(n
th, ikt′(j)), ∀n, ∀k, ∀j.
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2. #(1st, ikt (j)) > #(1
st, ikt (j
′)), ∀j < j′.
3. #(1st, ikt (j)) > #(1
st, ik
′
t′ (j)), ∀k < k′.
That is, two students who are each initially endowed with one seat with the same
position at the schools with same capacities have the same chances to their kth best
choices. For two students who are each initially endowed with one seat at different
positions on the priority lists at the schools with same capacities, the one at a higher
ranked position has a higher chance to her best choice. And for two students who are
each initially endowed with one seat at the same position on the priority list at the
schools with different capacities, the student from the school with smaller capacity
has a higher chance to her best choice.
When we talk about the chances or probabilities in the above school choice prob-
lem or in the house allocation problem discussed in chapter 3, we basically assume
that all possible preferences are equally like to occur. However, some schools or
objects might be more popular than others in the real world. How to formalize the
definition of fairness in these settings remains an open question.
In chapter 4, we study house allocation problems when indifferences are allowed.
We show that the serial dictatorship with fixed tie-breaking satisfies weak Pareto
efficiency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency, and further it is not
Pareto dominated by any Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rule. As corollaries
to Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez’s (1998) result, the relationship between the serial
dictatorships and the top trading cycles algorithm from individual endowments, and
the equivalence of random serial dictatorship and the top trading cycles algorithm
with random endowments still holds under weak preferences.
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